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ABSTRACT 
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During the “Arab Spring” the Arab world witnessed a wave of uprisings. As a result of 
these anti-government movements, four governments of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen were 
overthrown, three governments of Bahrain, Jordan, and to some points Saudi Arabia were faced 
with critical difficulties, and one government ,Syria, experienced domestic war. All these 
happened while some other Middle Eastern countries remained stable. Yet, the remaining 
questions are: how did these protests emerge? How was the collective identity which is essential 
for the social movements created? Why were some of these movements successful in 
overthrowing the regime while the others failed? What factors were involved in the success or 
failure of these social movements? In order to answer these questions this study reviews the 
mainstream theories of social movements to examine whether any of these theories are 
applicable to the case of MENA and whether they can explain the reason behind the formation of 
movements. This research argues that the traditional theories of social movements fall short in 
explaining the chaos in the MENA region as well as the reasons behind the formation of 
uprisings. Accordingly, by in depth analysis of three case studies of Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain 
and through comparing different involved countries in the Arab Spring, this study introduces 
four existing challenges in the MENA region. Later by defining relevant sub-categories for each 
challenge, institutional factors, facilitators, and determiners are recognized. Finally, by defining a 





ethnic/tribal division are the reason behind the formation of social movements of MENA and the 
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The timeline between 2010 and 2014 was equal to the emergence of many protests in 
thousands of cities around the world. There have been some movements and protests in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) which led to the transformation in countries like Tunisia 
and Egypt and some others could not achieve their main demands like in Bahrain, Yemen, and 
Libya. There has been a long and difficult history of the struggles of the Arab-majority countries 
regarding a more responsive and involved governance. However, the mutual point in all of them 
was pushing back the citizen’s demands, sometimes even with brutality. Eventually, despite all 
the fears and obstacles, dissatisfaction of the people with the governments, reached a point where 
people started to occupy the streets and shout for change. 
While the demands were not the same, thousands of people occupied the streets to call for 
political change in their countries. Some protests were against the denationalization of public 
services, some demanded higher budgets on social services, and less taxation, while in the 
majority of the movements in the MENA region the main demand was a complete transformation 
of the country’s political system and democracy. 
Soon after, the social movements in MENA have become so popular among the 
politicians and analysts both domestically and internationally. Moreover, the so-called Arab 
Spring’s domino effect had some long-term impacts on the MENA countries. The active 
presence or electoral success of Islamic extremism in some of these countries (e.g., Syria and 
Libya) has made some politicians much worried about the political perspective of the region that 





The importance of this topic has resulted from the fact that after the Islamic Revolution 
of Iran in 1979, the MENA region had not experienced any mass protests until the emergence of 
the Arab Spring and the Green movement in Iran. Further, even picturing any dramatic political 
and social transformations were hard and far-reaching for the people of the region and the 
foreign observers. However, with the emergence of these movements, all the previous 
assumptions collapsed 1. 
After the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, the Arab Spring and the Green Movement 
were the main anti-government protests and rebellions that spread across the Middle East in late 
2010.  The Green Movement, which was one of the important contemporary movements in the 
Middle East, happened in Iran because of the fraudulent presidential election in 2009. In the 
beginning, Iranian people’s main concern in the protests was the outcome of the election. Later, 
the nature of the movement, slogans, and demands changed dramatically. People were no more 
concerned only about their votes but called for a reformation. The regime started to confront the 
crowd, the military got involved and the government started to use force and suppression. Many 
people died, and two main candidates along many activists, journalists, and protesters got 
imprisoned 2. 
Most of the scholars in the field believe that the main demand of the contemporary 
movements in MENA is democracy. This variable is common among all the protest movements 
from Egypt and Tunisia to Yemen and Bahrain. Accordingly, this demand is what differentiates 
these movements from the 20th century movements. The 20th century movements were mostly 
 
1 Kurzman, C. (2012). The Arab spring: Ideals of the Iranian green movement, methods of the Iranian 
revolution. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 44(1), 162-165. 
 
2 Rabiei, Kamran. "Protest and Regime Change: Different Experiences of the Arab Uprisings and the 2009 Iranian 






related to Nationalism, Marxism, or had religious roots. None of these movements called for 
democracy as their first demand. However, this is the main feature of the contemporary 
movements in MENA.3. 
For instance, while the Green Movement at the beginning emerged because of the 
fraudulent election and was against the official announced result, later it demanded political, 
social, economic, and technological reformations. People started to demand reformation of the 
current status quo and moving towards a more pleasant situation with emphasizing a free, fair, 
and healthy election. The Green Movement was not just an electoral movement but a contentious 
movement against the lies, deceptions, inefficiencies, and authoritarianism backed into the 
regime. Based on the formal calculations and power’s definition, the Green Movement was a 
failed social movement. However, it is possible to argue that the Green Movement has not been a 
failure, because it has been remained and sustained itself in other lively and dynamic forms 4. 
Although many scholars believe that these movements have failed, it looks like that MENA 
social movements appear different from the classic social movements in the US and Europe.  
Ten years have passed from the emergence of the Green Movement, the social, 
contentious movement that emerged during the 2009 presidential elections and formed a coup. 
Its leaders are still imprisoned and the administration despite all the protests and objections 
which took a long time to process, remained on till the end of the legal period. Although the 
Arab spring or the Green Movement might not be successful in achieving their demands, they 
have initiated shaping a new era of political change. Therefore, in a world where social 
 
3 Elseewi, T. A. (2011). The Arab Spring| A Revolution of the Imagination. International Journal of 
Communication, 5, 10. 
 
4 Kurzman, C. (2012). The Arab Spring: Ideals of the Iranian Green Movement, methods of the Iranian 





movements have been and continued to be important drivers of political change, it is necessary to 
have a more thorough understanding of the political outcomes and consequences of the social 
movements 5.  
This dissertation is motivated by two research questions. what is the reason behind the 
emergence of these contemporary movements and how these protests emerged? What factors 
were involved in creation of various outcomes and the success or failure of these social 
movements? For answering these questions, I study the mainstream theories of social movements 
to see whether any of the classic and new social movements theories are applicable to the social 
movements of MENA? 
The literature regarding the questions about “how” and “why” social movements emerge 
is so rich. However, the political outcomes of the social movements are what the scholars have 
begun to study in the past two decades. The point is, it is not easy to examine whether the 
political outcome is the result of the particular social movement or of other factors within a 
specific context, during a particular time frame have caused that outcome. Accordingly, the 
political outcome would not be the same in any states with different political system, context, 
and another time frame What is obvious is that social movements would provide the population 
with valuable experiences even if they might not achieve the exact demand at the time.  
Demands for democracy, lack of economic development, lack of social justice, bad 
governance, political repression, social class division, youth and women status, and social media 
are all variables that were involved in the emergence of movements in MENA 6. However, the 
 
5 Tilly, C. (2017). From mobilization to revolution. In Collective Violence, Contentious Politics, and Social 
Change (pp. 71-91). Routledge. 
 






level of their impact and the way that governments react to these movements and protests, and 
the form of dispute were not similar in the studied countries in MENA7. 
I begin the dissertation by reviewing the mainstream theories of social movements and 
new social movement theories which I believe is necessary in order to have a broader perspective 
regarding the social movements of MENA. In chapter 2, by applying these theories to the case of 
MENA I discuss the incapability of the traditional and new social movement theories in 
explaining the dynamics of contemporary social movements in MENA in terms of the 
differences in the political context, the magnitude of mobilization potentials, organizational 
characteristics, and action orientation.  
There is a vast amount of both theoretical and empirical literature on social movements. 
There are many scholarly debates on the theories of social movements and the consequences of 
social movements. The mainstream theories of social movements are the ones that emerged in 
the United States and Europe during the 70-80s. These theories were created to explain the 
classical movements like civil rights, national student liberation, and anti-war movements 8. 
Each of these movements had an agenda, they were all politically oriented, and moreover, 
they all originated to progress towards democracy. For instance, in Europe, the new social 
movement theories which emerged because of the student movement of 1968, environmental, 
ecological, and feminist movements took a path that was non-class and new in terms of political 
 
7 Bosi, Lorenzo, and Katrin Uba. "Introduction: the outcomes of social movement." Mobilization 14 (2009): 409-
415. 
 
8 Russell, Adrienne. "The Arab Spring| Extra-National Information Flows, Social Media and the 2011 Egyptian 






and social logic. The new avenue was directed at addressing what was believed to be the absence 
in classical Marxism, namely a tendency toward economic and class reductionism 9. 
The dominant theory used in studying social movements in the United States is Resource 
Mobilization Theory (RMT), with the focus on economic factors and resources for collective 
actions. This theory seeks to examine, in the presence of political opportunities, how actors 
recognize the opportunities and initiate actions 10. Later, with the development of social 
movement theories, scholars shift the focus from material resources and humans to the political 
environment. The best known of these theories is the Political Process Theory (PPT). According 
to this theory, that provides an opportunity for collective actions is the opening of political 
opportunities and structural factors, such as factors that are stable and are outside of the control 
of movement actors 11. 
In chapter 3, I review the historical context of the Middle East and explain the nature of 
MENA movements which is the reason behind the necessity of a new model or theory for 
explaining the MENA movements. I argue that the factor which prevents formation of real and 
peaceful social movement in MENA like the rest of the world is lack of democracy. Thus, in 
chapter 5, I discuss the obstacles to democracy which is the reason behind the difference between 
the MENA movements and other social movements. In chapter 6, I study three case studies, the 
successful cased of Tunisia and Egypt along the failed case of Bahrain by help of four main 
present challenges in the Middle East. By reviewing these challenges, I offer an analytical 
 
9 Buechler, S. M. (1995). New social movement theories. Sociological Quarterly, 36(3), 441-464. 
10 Tarrow, S. G. (2011). Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics. Cambridge University 
Press. 
 






approach in chapter 7, that explains all the impactful factors for formation of social movements 
in MENA region. 
Based on all the impactful variables on the formation of social movements in the region 
and the present challenges, I suggest a model in chapter 8 which is capable to explain the social 
movements of MENA. Later, in this chapter I argue that the first three challenges are the reason 
behind the formation of the social movements in MENA. Accordingly, the fourth challenge and 
its subcategory which are three factors can help us to define the variation of the outcome, 
success, or failure of a movement in MENA.  
In chapter 9, the conclusion, I endeavor to make several contributions by discussing the 
various scenarios which the presence or absence of these three variables could cause and answer 
the key question which this dissertation is motivated by. I argue that the outcomes of social 
movements in the MENA are not like the consequences of social movements in other countries. 
Finally, I discuss some of the limitation of this project and potential extension of the project in 
future studies.   
To examine these questions this research endeavors to argue the new wave of social 
movements is not explainable through the old theories of social movements. Additionally, not all 
the theories of social movements either old or new are applicable to the region of MENA. 
By comparing political outcomes of three case studies, this research will answer these 
questions and present a model for describing the political outcomes of social movements in 
MENA. Besides this research aims to argue that the outcomes of social movements in the MENA 
are not like the consequences of social movements in other countries. Further, we explore 
answers to the questions by applying a case study approach. In order to analyze the involved 





contemporary cases that happened in the MENA (The Arab Spring both successful and 
unsuccessful cases), to comprehend various social movements inside the Middle East with the 
help of the old and new theories of social movements12. 
  
 








LITERATURE REVIEW: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS 
Before elaborating on the main arguments of this dissertation and discussing it, it is 
necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of the main definition of contentious politics 
and realize what contentious politics is about. However, first I must point out the distinction 
between contentious politics and social movement. Although sometimes these two terms are 
used interchangeably, they are quite different concepts. Yet first I must define “contentious 
politics”. Tilly and Tarrow (2015)13, define contentious politics as what actors do by using public 
performances to make claims on authorities. Involved actors in contentious politics by taking 
advantage of public opportunities would use some forms of collective actions (repertoires) to 
make the claims on the authorities. The claim could be on any demand which is against other 
actor’s interests or somehow lead to mutual interests or programs which are related to the 
governments either as the initiators of claims or third parties. Tilly and Tarrow (2015)14 argue 
that what makes contentious politics different from social movements is that contentious politics 
is the point where three features of contention, collective action and politics converge.  
Social movements have several basic properties of movements. The contention is about 
making claims which are somehow standing on other actor’s interests. Thus, it could be said that 
more than one party is involved in contention so that one party works as a subject who is making 
a claim and the other one as an object who is the receiver of a claim. Yet, the range of claims 
 
13 Tarrow, Sidney, and Charles Tilly. Policy (s) of the conflict. From the strike to the revolution. Paris: The Paris 








could vary from a very decent one to more vociferous demands or even attacks which could be 
threatening to the object’s interests. So, the main components of the contention are subjects, 
objects, and claims. (Johnston, 1995)15  
 





Collective action refers to any non-institutionalized harmonious endeavors in the 
direction of shared interests. Collective actions could occur both outside and inside the political 
environment or even without any contention 16. 
 
15 Johnston, Hank, and Bert Klandermans. "The cultural analysis of social movements." Social movements and 
culture 4 (1995): 3-24. 
 
16 McAdam, Doug, and Yang Su. "The war at home: Antiwar protests and congressional voting, 1965 to 











 Until the time that there is no direct interaction with the government or no engagement in 
activities related to government interests or regulations, the collective action has nothing to do 
with the political environment. According to Tilly and Tarrow, politics which is the third 
component of the contentious politics also ranges from simple usual matters to significant topics. 
However, most likely politics bring little or no contention to the overall situation. 
There are four primary types of collective actions: the crowd, the masses, the public, and the 
social movements. According to Lofland (1993) 17 the crowd refers to a massive number of  
people in nearness. The masses and the public are quite similar. However, the masses refer to a 
large group of people with a common interest while the public is an unorganized massive group 
of people with common ideas. 
Although sometimes the term social movement is being used interchangeably with 
notions of contentious politics, Tarrow and Tilly by providing plenty of evidence argue that 
expansion of the term social movement for defining all the social movement bases (social 
background, collective action, organizational resources, etc.) has some downsides. The first 
drawback is that putting all types of contention under the same category would make an accurate 
comparison hard. Secondly, by counting all forms of contention as social movements testing 
transitions among them would be problematic. Lastly, categorizing all contention under the 
social movement label would make the fact that social movements are not a universal but a 
vague historical category. 
Now the question we must ask is what meets the requirements of a social movement? 
Each group of scholars has defined “social movement” differently. Some groups defined social 
movements as an action in which actors of central conflicts in society would lead the direction of 
 






the conflict in the exact opposite direction of the historical process by expressing their critical 
oppositions 18. 
While others define social movements as an act which by expressing a specific type of 
collective action, aims to move beyond the limits of a given system. 
Tarrow and Tilly define a social movement as a continuous campaign in which actors by using 
repeated repertoires make certain claims. According to Sidney Tarrow, what is important about 
social movements is that they have proceeded as interactive campaigns like electoral or religious 
and not as solo performances. Accordingly, social movements defined as the relations between 
groups of claimants and the object of their claims with third parties like authorities, adversaries, 
and allies while the role of various citizens in clarifying the campaigns is usually significant. 
(Tilly and Tarrow, 2007.)19Yet, Tilly and Tarrow make the point that not all forms of contentious 
politics are social movements.  
Solo performances of public or claimants would not count as a social movement but 
interactive campaigns. Social movements are a combination of continuous campaigns of claim- 
making; a collection of public performances such as rallies, demonstrations; constant public 
displays such as wearing specific colors or displaying signs, chanting slogans which all these 
social movement bases are built on links and network, organizations and unions. Henceforth, 
what counts as a social movement is the synthesis of these three elements (Tilly, 2004)20. This 
combination might not be a new concept in Western countries since the emergence of the social 
 
18 Touraine, Alain. "The voice and the eye: An analysis of social movements." (1981). 
 
19 Tarrow, Sidney, and Charles Tilly. "Contentious politics and social movements." In the Oxford handbook of 
comparative politics. 2007. 
 






movements in the late eighteenth century, but it was uncommon or even absent in much of the 
contemporary world especially MENA which is the case of this study.  
The important point which should be mentioned is the necessity of another concept other 
than a combination of the above three elements for emerging of a social movement. That concept 
is democratization. Democratization is a factor that could enhance the formation of social 
movements. Tilly (2004) defines democratization as an enhancement of regimes in providing 
comprehensive and equal citizenship with protection and creating channels and resources for 
offering consultations to citizen’s demands. Democratic institutions, he continues, could 
decrease the array of well-known and popular collective actions and limit violent uprisings.  
Change and variation in some elements could cause different outcomes and consequences for 
social movements in time and space. The social movements, in time and space, could disappear 
or morph into another form of politics 21. 
The main element which could cause different outcomes is political environments; The 
character of a social movement in democracy will not be like a social movement in non-
democracy. The second element is the interactions that occur within the course of a social 
movement; for instance, the outcome of a social movement could change dramatically based on 
an interaction of police guards with demonstrators from a peaceful protest to a violent revolt. 
Lastly, the communication between the participants in social movements, the citizens, authorities 
 
21 Goldstone, Jack Andrew. "Cross-class Coalitions and the Making of the Arab Revolts of 2011." Swiss Political 







or any object of claims during the source of social movement could sometimes lead to achieving 
a great outcome or in contrast could totally mislead the social movement 2223. 
Social movements can occur in three stages of local, national, and global. Moreover, 
according to Aberle (1966)24, there are some related classifications and patterns of social 
movements that are based on their demand and the amount of change they want which could help 
us to understand them better: reform movements, revolutionary movements, redemptive 
movements, alternative movements, and resistance movements.  
Reform movements advocate for minor changes in the social structure (Anti-nuclear 
movement). In contrast, resistance movements try to prevent or undo any change to social 
structure (The Ku Klux Klan). On the other hand, revolutionary movements seek fundamental 
and radical changes in every feature of the society (movements of 1979 in Iran against the Shah, 
Chinese communist movements, Bolsheviks in Russia). Redemptive movements usually have a 
religious nature and seek to arouse ideality, inner change, and spirituality in individuals (New 
age). Lastly, alternative movements aim is self-improvement and creating changes in an 
individual’s beliefs and principles 25. 
Now that we studied the definition of the social movement, its preconditions, and various 
types, in the rest of the chapter, we will review various theories of social movements. 
 
22 Chabot, Sean, and Jan Willem Duyvendak. "Globalization and transnational diffusion between social movements: 
reconceptualizing the dissemination of the Gandhian repertoire and the" coming out’ routine." Theory and 
Society 31, no. 6 (2002): 697-740 
 
23 Scalmer, Sean. "The labor of diffusion: the peace pledge union and the adaptation of the Gandhian 
repertoire." Mobilization: An International Quarterly 7, no. 3 (2002): 269-286. 
 
24 Aberle, David F. "A Classification of Social Movements." The Peyote Religion among the Navaho (1966): 315-
33. 
 






Thus, first we are going to review the mainstream theories of the social movements, analyze 
them and examine the changes in theories of social movements through the time. Later, by 
analyzing the roots and origins of these theories the aim of this chapter is to establish the 
theoretical context for this dissertation. To have a broad understanding of the roots and origins of 
theories of social movements, it is necessary to dig in the scholarly debates and perspectives 
from the late 1970s to the present and review the real causes and preconditions for the 
occurrence of the social movements. Lastly, in this chapter we are going to examine whether 
achieving the demanded outcome in different social and political contexts would be the same. 
Also we are going to examine whether the theories of social movements would be able to explain 
MENA region since the existing theories are particularly based on social movements in Northern 
democracies and their capability for explaining the emergence of social movements and the 
essential requirements in non-democracies is unclear.   
To begin, first we are going to clarify one of the main scholarly debates which questions 
whether social movements can create structural and political changes or if social movements are 
the outcomes of political change and not the cause of it 26. 
 While the answer to this question would be different in different contexts such as 
democracies or non-democracies, my research supports the scholars who believe social 
movements are not the outcome but the main drivers of social and political change and playing 
key roles in transforming autocracy to democracy.27 
 
26 Earl, Jennifer. "Methods, movements, and outcomes." Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change 22 
(2000): 3-25. 
 









In this regard, having a comprehensive understanding of the theories of social movements 
and collective action is beneficial and necessary. With a broad understanding about these 
theories we would be able to describe and explain social movements and also examine the way 
such movements form and mobilize, what outcome they try to achieve, what they are mobilizing 
against, assess policies and strategies regarding the particular outcomes and, also to what extent 
this mobilization or counter-mobilization could succeed or fail. 28 
All these theories have a background and history and none of them arise or operate in a 
vacuum. Accordingly, in response to the realities of subject-matter, they have gone through 
many changes and renovations. However, the point of this dissertation’s explaining the 
background of these theories to highlight the intellectual tools that they provide are not 
compatible with the task of explaining social movements in MENA.  
Theories of social movements have experienced substantial changes since the 1940s, 
especially in the last couple of years. These changes had a significant impact on socio-historical 
contexts and on the experiences, which caused the theorists to revise the definition of their 
subject-matter. 
To explain the different types of social movements in different social conditions along 
with the history behind their formation and their achieved political outcomes, we must study the 
main leading social movement theories from a historical perspective. 
 
2.1 The Classical Theories of Social Movements 
 
The content of most of the collective action in the 1950s and 1960s contrasted with 
conventional definitions for political participation. It promoted concepts like peace, freedom and 
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civil rights which all were advocating moving from self-centered ideas towards emancipation. 
The American theorists took their inspirations from the dominant social movements that 
happened in the 60s like the American Civil Rights movements, the Anti-War Movement, and 
the National Student Liberation. While these movements each had specific demands like calling 
an end to racial segregation in the American civil rights, removal of the US military and troops 
national student liberation, they all had one thing in common; all were self-consciously oriented 
and all were perceived as forces for paving the way towards democracy. (Skopol,1979)29 
The contemporary treatment of collective behavior theory and identity builds upon the classical 
theories and social-psychological grounds.  
The key sources for sociological studying of social movements beginning in the 1970s 
were four mainstream theories: Collective behavior theory, resource mobilization theory, 
framing, and political process theory. Since many leading social theorists had a Marxist 
background or were members of student movements of the 60s and 70s, the Marxist theory was 
one of the impactful theories on the study of collective phenomena 30313233. Thus, before 
examining these four schools of thought we must briefly review theories of Marx, Lenin, 
Gramsci, and Tilly since they were the initiators of social movement theories and their emphasis 
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on the element of collective action was determinative. Marx and Engels were the initiators of 
theories of social movements. According to them, individuals will involve in collective actions 
when their social class is in paradox with its adversaries. 
In the Marxist theory, the foundation of collective action is self-awareness of a class of 
society from their task regarding making a change and reformation. Put differently, they believe 
that social structure is the foundation of collective action. Thus, as other scholars argue, Marx 
and Engels instead of studying mechanisms that attract individuals into collective actions just 
refer to the collective engagement of individuals to society’s structural development. 
They did not consider the role of resources and politics which is needed to engage in collective 
actions. the problem which has concerned theorists since then was although according to Marx 
engagement of the individuals in collective actions based on their self-awareness 34. 
 But what is the reason that some actors despite the presence of objective conditions for revolt 
sometimes fail to do so? He replied to his critiques with the theory of “false consciousness” 
which argues that the failure of actors to act at the proper time is due to unawareness caused by 
their class enemies. Although this argument was not acceptable since scholars believe that 
examining false or realness of consciousness is not possible 35. 
According to social movement theorists, Marx’s theory was flawed because it did not 
consider the role of leadership or even the culture of the working-class. In general, he ignored 
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addressing the role of political conditions which are compulsory for creating proper opportunities 
for revolutionary mobilization36. 
  The main critique of Marxist theory was Lenin whose major concern was the problem of 
leadership. His main argument and criticism of Marx’s theory was regarding the objective 
conditions. By referring to the Western European experiences he argues that instead of waiting 
for objective conditions, it is possible to create an organization with a revolutionary leadership to 
solve the problem of the working class37.  
Later, Lenin’s theory took hold in Russia and the occurrence of the Communist 
movement at that time weakened Western social democracy. The failure of the Russian 
Revolution moving towards the West in 1917, was the main argument of Gramsci, a European 
Marxist that raising a revolution in the West is not possible with vanguard forms of 
organizations. By criticizing Lenin’s theory, he emphasizes on working-class culture. Thus, by 
revising Lenin’s theory he suggests training a team of organic intellectuals to complement 
traditional ones in the party leadership. He believes in this way by producing a countercultural 
harmony among workers it is possible to give workers the ability to interact with other social 
establishments. Yet, he was aware that this task requires the party to learn how to deal with the 
ups and downs of the middle-class society. This was what caused a new dilemma38.The problem 
was Gramsci’s theory not only did not have a guideline regarding the ways to fight the battle 
between the working and middle-class but was just based on the influence of the working-class 
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on bourgeois society and ignored the common sense of middle-class society. Moreover, his 
theory was flawed since it was without a theory of political mobilization it was not able to 
distinguish between polities with strong or weak opportunities and limitations 39. 
Among the next generation, there was Charles Tilly, influenced by Marxism, who is well 
known for his ideas related to structural variables in shaping contention, state structure and state 
strategic imperatives (Tilly, 1986;1990). Later, Tilly introduces his “Polity Model” which studies 
the interactions among rulers, polity members and outside actors (1977)40. Since all the above 
theories had some shortcomings, beginning the 1970s, contemporary social scientists started to 
propose solutions to these flaws. With all being said, now we are going to briefly review the four 
main schools of thought which emerged in social science to examine their contribution to the 
concept of social movement and contentious politics as of today. 
 
2.2 Collective Behavior Theory 
 
Collective behavior theory as its early version began to form by arguments of theorists 
such as Le Bon (1985), lofland (1993) and Blumer (1969) is noninstitutionalized activity in 
which several people voluntarily engage According to this group of scholars, there are four 
primary forms of collective behavior, the crowd, the mass, the public and social movements. In 
all these forms of collective behavior people would be engaged voluntarily for a common 
interest. The crowds are usually formed by many people. There are four different types of crowd: 
casual crowds, conventional crowds, expressive crowds, and acting crowds. Casual crowds are a 
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group of people that are present in the same place at a same time but do not have any interaction 
with each other. Conventional crowds same as the previous group are in the same place at the 
same time but for a planned or scheduled event. The goal of the third type of crowd is expressing 
emotions. And the focus of the last type of crowd is on a goal or an action. 
A mass refers to many people with common interest but incapable of acting together in 
an organized collaborative way. A public is so like the mass regarding the large number of 
people who are unrelated and unorganized, but the main difference is while the members of a 
mass have common interests, the members of a public share ideas. The last category which is 
social movements was explained in detail before 41. They viewed members of the crowd as 
irrational, uncontrolled groups of people who join uprisings or riots since outside the crowd they 
would not be able to as an anonymous member.  
There are three main theories on collective behavior. The first, the emergent-norm 
perspective, emphasizes the importance of social norms in crowd behavior. The next, the value-
added theory, is a functionalist perspective that states that several preconditions must be in place 
for collective behavior to occur. Finally, the assembling perspective focuses on collective action 
rather than collective behavior, addressing the processes associated with crowd behavior and the 
lifecycle and various categories of gatherings. 
Accordingly, the classical social movement theorists such as Smelser (1962) builds on 
earlier collective behavior theorists, that social movements emerge as a result of any severe 
social strain due to interruption in the normal functioning of society (social change), like 
industrial development, technologies, and urbanization. Thus, according to Smelser for the 
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occurrence of an episode of collective behavior which is the necessity of social movement, at 
least some sort of strain must be present 42. 
However, the mentioned features were related to the earlier version of the collective 
behavior theory. Later, political scientists revised this theory to create a politically connected 
view of social movements. In contrast to classic collective behavior theorists, political scientists 
argue that movements do not occur as a matter of disruption in the normal functioning of society. 
Social movements are logical happenings and related crowds that have rational behaviors. They 
treat interest groups as a normal part of the political process since they believe that societies are 
rarely stable. Moreover, while system strain always presents to some degree, relying on it as the 
main cause of social movements is problematic. It is possible to argue that strain is a required, 
but an inadequate prerequisite of social movements 43. 
 
2.3 Political Process Theory (PPT) 
 
Another social movement theory developed by American scholars encouraged by the 
upsurge of contentious politics in the Civil Rights movement is known as political process 
theory. Tilly (1978) was the one who started initiating ideas related to preconditions for 
mobilization such as opportunity/threat to protesters and facilitation/repression by the system. 
While some American social scientists started focusing on urban politics and linking protests to 
different measures of local opportunity or even using protest as a political resource, Doug 
McAdam (1999)44 by elaborating on Tilly’s model and synthesizing all these various approaches, 
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developed “political process model. In contrast to the Tilly’s model, political process theorists 
instead of focusing on all features of opportunity/threat and facilitation/repression just tried to 
emphasis on opportunities to examine different concerns like how movements exploit 
opportunities or how various political structures would be able to create different degrees of 
opportunity to uprising groups and lastly study the process of change of opportunities related to a 
specific movement over time.  
According to McAdam, political opportunity can explain the emergence of social 
movements with the help of various elements. The first one is related to having enough access to 
the political system which varies based on the degree of the system’s openness. The second one 
is the stability or instability of coalitions and political ranks. The next element is the presence of 
potential allies and their position. Another factor is related to the conflicts among or inside the 
elites who facilitate or limit collective action and their tolerance for handling the grievances. The 
other factor is the ability of the political system to block oppositional movements. The last factor 
that has been added recently is basically regarding the international/geopolitical forces that can 
generate the desirable opportunities for the occurrence of a movement. 
All the mentioned factors are impactful on protestant behaviors and their formation, the 
occurrence of the movements and besides the interaction of movements with the political system. 
PPT theorists emphasize an advancement of a universal theory of social movements which has 
been predicated upon some structural constant factors that movements actors have no control 
over them. Put differently, according to PPT what could initiate the mobilization of a mass 







confluence of the public’s awareness of that presence along with the ability and willingness to 
exploit it45. 
The problem which almost was present in all various political process theorist’s works 
until the 1990s was applicability of the political process models to just democratize the West and 
nowhere else.  
The second problem of the political process until the 1990s was related to undermining the role 
of repression and threat. And lastly, although the name of the model was political process theory, 
it did not examine the process of contention and scholars failed to study the correlation of 
different elements in the model to one another and its related mechanisms.  
Moreover, this theory contrasts with RMT because instead of focusing on human and material 
resources which are available to social movement organizations it focuses on the political 
environment which SMO’s are active in 46. 
Since PPT could shape the research agenda of the field, among scholars of social 
movement it is known as the “hegemonic paradigm”. This model assumes political opportunities 
have the potential to create the required opportunity for collective actions.  
 
2.4 Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) 
 
Development of the Resource mobilization theory began by criticizing classical theories 
that argue social movements are arising under social disorganization and injustice conditions.  
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The initiators of this theory, McCarthy and Zald (1973)47, argue that the cumulative level of 
strain or dissatisfaction which according to the collective behavior theorists are the causal 
significance of the social movements are insufficient causes. In contrast, according to the 
resource mobilization theory, insurgency arises from the increase in the level of essential 
resources to support collective protest activity, not rise in discontent.  
Thus, the key factor in the success of this theory is about the available resources and how 
to exploit them; e.g. using the existing organization for forming coalitions, forming effective and 
structured campaigns in response to political pressures, demanding financial support, career 
benefits and security. 
Based on their arguments, generally, resource mobilization theorists disregard ideology 
or any irrational factor in the study of social movements. In fact, scholars such as McCarthy, 
Zald, Tilly, and Oberschall believe that social movements are rational, organized, and targeted 
phenomena that arise by calculating the cost and benefit. 
This theory which is known as one of the dominant theories for studying social 
movements in the United States aims to explain how actors could use the most out of the created 
opportunities in the political system, either preventive or facilitative.  Based on RMT, the role 
which resources play for oppositional groups before mobilization and how these groups engage 
these resources is so critical to define how capable they are in making their presence felt and if 
they can to create any level of change (Jenkins, 1983)48. 
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What needs to be mentioned here is that according to the main social movement’s 
theorists, Charles Tilly, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, preparation for mobilization to fight 
with injustice, which is always in the society, needs both resources and rational orientation to 
action 49. Put differently, the actions of actors in social movements should not be interpreted as if 
they are controlled by feelings, emotions, or thoughts, but should be read in terms of 
opportunities for actions or the logic of costs and benefits. In this theory, what appears as a 
crucial feature of social mobilization is leadership. Zald and McCarthy emphasis on the key role 
which this factor could play in recognizing and outlining the complaints and using the 
opportunities for beginning collective action. As such, structured leadership is the precondition 
of structured group action. 
Additionally, the focus of RMT is on the economic factor or aspects related to money and 
labor to raise collective actions. In this schema, the occurrence, strength, and impact of a social 
movement organization (SMO) is significantly correlated with the capacity to collectivize the 
efficient communications and effective people. As such, RMT is based on this principle that a 
high level of technical expertise is the requisite of the social change50. 
 
2.5 Framing Theory 
 
The occurrence of movements with no time for mobilizing resources or the failure of 
some well-founded groups for attaining actual collective actions, calls into question the 
significance of resource mobilization theory for explaining the establishment of social 
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movements51. The concept of the frame was initiated by Goffman (1974)52 and later found its 
way to the study of social movements. According to Goffman frames are outlined that let 
individuals make occurrences in the world meaningful based on the set of beliefs. in other words, 
frames consist of action-oriented sets of beliefs that could validate happenings and operations 
related to a social movement organization 53. Accordingly, the collective action frames would 
endlessly evolve during the movement meetings and campaigns.  
The main purposes of the evolution of frames are to absorb more members, mobilizing the 
participants, obtaining more resources. 
The focus of this theory is interpreting the role of shared expectations and norms held by 
actors in events and curing the problems. Thus, frame processes attempt to analyze collective 
actions represented by actors in terms of motivations, beliefs, and discourses.  Moreover, it 
focuses on the process of production and utilization of frames during different phases of a 
movement along with the impact of ideas, culture, and attitudes on the repertoires of action and 
contention 54. 
Additionally, frame theory mentions the critical roles of ideology, its contradictions, and 
the consequences it could bring for followers, counter-movements, and the system. Factors such 
as language, leadership, media, and institutions all have a significant impact on the framing 
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process.  According to Benford and Snow (2005)55, successful social movements adhere to three 
categories of frames for achieving their goals: Diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and 
motivational framing.  
Diagnostic framing offers a clear solution for a specific demand. The claim of this type of 
framing is “we believe something is wrong and we know how to fix it”. Prognostic framing 
states the solution for the social movement problem along with the application. Lastly, 
motivational framing calls for action. This frame is what happens once individuals agree with 
either diagnostic or prognostic framing. 
 
2.6 New Social Movement Theory 
 
This theory arises in the 1970s, from the classic European social theory and political 
philosophy with critics on the dominant Marxist theory which looks at social movements as 
mirroring a major conflict among classes regarding economic production. In other words, the 
main aim of this theory was explaining the increase of postindustrial, or movements related to 
the quality of life, which are not explainable by using the classic theories of social movements 56. 
In general, new social movements tempt to discuss different features of everyday life or 
what traditionally is being called outside politics by getting through the traditional class, 
socioeconomic associations, and political parties. The nature of these movements is more 
relaxed, diverse, and informal with preference of non-hierarchical methods and irregular political 
engagement in comparison to the older social movements.  
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Since the emergence of the new social movement theories was along with different 
themes in Europe like the student movement that chose them in 1968, such as feminist and 
ecological movements and anti-nuclear movements, the new social movement theories selected a 
direction against the classical Marxism in order to cover both non-class and new social and 
political logic 57. 
The key objective of this theory which was initiated by European theorists like Alberto 
Melucci (1994)58 and Allen Touraine was proving the insufficiency of classical Marxism by 
arguing that the foundation of all the politically significant social action was rooted in capitalism 
and all other social logics were inferior at best in shaping social action. Accordingly, the main 
claim of this theory was creating a structural development in Western societies and improving 
the previous class conflicts. 
In fact, the reason behind the emergence of new social movements theory was the 
appearance of some types of movements which at their core were not related to grievances of a 
group of people seeking to influence political outcomes. New social movements (NSMs) were 
being based on the features of postindustrial societies and concepts related to the quality of life 
and self-realization 59. 
Touraine was inspired by the 1968 France movements and explained his social movement 
theory by the idea of social action. According to him, human societies not only can reproduce 
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themselves but also would be able to produce their goals and values. Besides, human societies 
have the ability of self-reflection and self-production. 
Melucci, on the other hand, was inspired by Jurgen Habermas’s60 thoughts. According to 
him, in modern societies, due to the expansion of the government and market, the individualistic 
activities of people have decreased. Thus, the new social movements attempt to stand against the 
comprehensive intervention of the system and revive the individuality and the right to have a 
specific quality of life. The new movement aims to increase the scope of individual authority 
outside the government control and preserve personal independence against the political and 
bureaucratic intervention of the government. The new social movements mostly try to challenge 
the current policies in society. Their goal is the creation of a safe environment for individuals 
with no authority to practice their philosophies freely 61. 
Regarding the comparison between the traditional and new social movement theories 
there is one characteristic of new social movement theories that distinguish those from other 
social movement theories. New social movement are hypothesized and shaped in a specific 
historical phase of progress of Western liberal societies. Precisely, while each theory focus and 
explain differentiated models clearly like modernization and post modernization, post-materialist 
society, post-industrial society or advanced capitalist society, they all have one shared aim which 
is operating based upon a kind of “societal totality”. This societal totality is chained to any new 
evolving structural factors in Western Europe that were generating new forms of sociopolitical 
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action while the old order was disbanding in the process of creating a context for collective 
action 62. 
In extension, I am going to elaborate more on the comparison between the features of 
new social movements with the classic movements and briefly describe the results. 
 
Table 1. Comparison Between Classic and New Social Movements 
 
 
• Goal: the classical social movements were working along with the status quo; while new 
social movements challenging the status quo. Put differently, their concern is the status 
quo and not just the system.  
• Struggle: the struggle in classical movements was about production and distribution but 
in new social movements, values and principles are the main concerns. 
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Classical Social Movements New Social Movements 
Goal 
Working along with the status 
quo Challenging the status quo 
Struggle 
Class-conflict regarding the 
distribution and production 
Conflict regarding the norm 
and values 
Motivation 
Using movements as a tool for 
reaching benefit and 
advantages 
Motivation is expressing 
being/ informal in 
participation and membership 
Structure 
Static, focused, and 
hierarchical 
flexible, diverse, open, and 
participatory 
Strategy 
Cooperating with the 
government for reaching the 
goals 
Impacting public mind/people 






• Motivation: in classical movements, the movement was a tool for reaching benefits and 
advantages but in new movements, motivation is expressing being and identity and 
participation is voluntary with no expectation. 
• Structure: the classical movements were structured, static and hierarchical while new 
movements are flexible, diverse, and open. 
• Strategy: strategies of classical movements were either for cooperating with the 
government or dominating it to reach their goals. New social movements by following 
outside politics try to influence public minds and they are not after political power. 
(Bradley, 2005)63 
To conclude, what is clear is that all these theories, either classic or new have been 
developed almost exclusively regarding the social movements occurred in western democracies 
particularly Europe and United States. As a result, our understanding about the formation, 
development, and the political outcomes of social movements in other parts of the world remains 
underdeveloped. What is clear is that the formation of the social movements and the changes 
they could cause all differ based on the political (democracy or non-democracy), economic, and 
social context they might occur. Effective strategies in one context might not work in another 
context. Most of the mechanisms of the mentioned theories are not relevant to the closed political 
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APPLYING DIFFERENT SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES TO THE CASE OF 
MENA 
The occurrence of social movements is ultimately dependent on the presence of a 
conducive political environment. A conducive political environment according to McAdam 
(1994)65 can provide opportunities for successful uprisings. Yet, some resources should be 
existing, so that the actors would be able to obtain the mentioned opportunities. Thus, it is 
possible to argue that the presence of the essential resources, the aggrieved population with 
conversion potential, would be able to change the political opportunities to a social protest. 
A conducive political environment consists of five crucial resources that I am going to briefly 
explain. Participants, social movement organizations, solidarity incentives, networks, leaders. 
According to the scholars, members can be recruited by some indigenous organizations 
which are well known as the primary source of movement participants or they can be all 
members of a specific coalition with the same demands and dissatisfactions. In both cases as 
Oberschall (1978)66 argues the process of mobilization does not happen by recruiting isolated 
and solitary members but in contrast individuals who are already prepared and contributors.  
The second resources are social movement organization (SMOs). The tasks of SMOs 
vary based on the size and culture of the society, but any type of society SMOs must compete 
with other sectors and associations for resources (money, facilities, and labor). But basically, 
their tasks are managing mobilizing supporters, handling the financial resources, encouraging 
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mass and the elite public to join the movement, and realizing the change in targets 67. SMOs have 
nothing to do with the formation of social movements.  
The other resources are established structures of solidarity incentives which are available 
to indigenous organizations. This term refers to rewards or the motive force which encourages 
participation in these groups and at the same time stop the problem of free riding. In fact, based 
on these incentives, members should participate in the process to get the reward. However, it 
should be mentioned that rewards could be affected based on the structure of society and 
authorities 68. 
The next source is the way in which the aggrieved members of these organizations 
communicate with each other. It is through the established networks and infrastructures which 
the quality of movements truly depends on them. Social movement theorists believe that failure 
or success of contemporary social movements highly depend on the presence or absence of a 
solid network of communication.  
Lastly, almost all the social movement theorists have declared the importance of a 
recognized leadership for directing a social movement. In fact, it is possible that the aggrieved 
population cannot handle the correct collective action at the right time even with the presence of 
favorable political opportunities.  
Thus, the existence of these sources is crucial for the preparation of a conducive political 
environment in which the occurrence of social movements would be so likely in it.  
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Now, after reviewing the required resources and desirable preconditions for the emergence of 
social movements I am going to apply some of the mainstream theories of social movements to 




3.1 Applying the Resource Mobilization Theory on the MENA  
 
Based on all the mentioned theories in chapter one, both American and European social 
movement theorists define social movements as episodes of collective actions which mostly 
present and structured constant, self-conscious challenge to the present authorities 69. 
These theories emerged in constitutionally open and technically advanced western societies. 
Accordingly, the main attempts of these theories were operating business-like enterprises whose 
success is dependent on technical proficiency factors. Moreover, the acts of mobilization and 
objection are more related to engaging and influencing the key political institutions like houses 
of representatives, congresses, and political parties by the actors of the movement to create the 
desired changes 70. 
Resource mobilization theory which is known as one of the leading models for studying 
collective actions in Western societies tries to explain how in presence of political opportunities 
(both facilitative or inhibitive ones) actors would be able to recognize and grasp the opportunities 
in order to initiate proper actions.  Thus, according to Buechler, in this scenario, what is crucial 
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in distinguishing the outcome and the level of change the oppositional group can create, is the 
resources available to them before mobilizing along with the ways they employed the resources.  
Accordingly, another factor that plays a significant role in social mobilization is 
structured leadership. This factor could help actors both to recognize grievances and related 
opportunities for starting collective action 71. In fact, RMT theorists believe that the requirement 
for a fruitful one is an executive leadership. 
Now the question is whether this would be the case in a context where political settings 
like proper institutions and specialized staffs are non-existent or if they are present, they are 
either non-qualified or hardly limited by the authoritarian systems. Additionally, since the 
political channels for causing an impactful change or creating social and political reforms are 
under the control of parties with domination over specific exercises of power, mobilization acts 
like petitioning or lobbying for persuading the government of creating change is futile 72. 
MENA region is the only region that is home to several states with all the above characteristics, 
where mobilization is severely handicapped. Thus, MENA would be a great case for examining 
these questions, since any of the countries in this region such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
and Iran have a unique history of authoritarianism. Moreover, according to the evidence, all the 
mentioned countries were stubborn in establishing conditions for the requirement of professional 
staff and launching formal organizations. For instance, Iran experienced the improvement of civil 
society under the administration of Mohammad Khatami (1977-2005), who was a reformist. 
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with some degree of freedom. However, this was a unique case and lasted until the rise of 
Ahmadinejad to power. Nothing like this case has ever happened in any other more authoritarian 
settings that opponent groups have even a low degree of authority or opportunity to involve in 
any type of dissident actions. 
Relatedly, in all the closed authoritarian environments, government by infusing different 
strategies into oppositional movements tries to restrict any act of mobilization attempted to 
convince the system to adopt social and political alterations. In the case of MENA, most of the 
challenges to the present authorities are some form of open and short-lived contentions without 
any ideology, structure or official leadership as opposed to the organized and sustained social 
movements of the WEST 73. 
Another possibility which also happens in MENA states is barricading any social or 
political change which is going to happen by parties with a monopoly overpower. Thus, in 
circumstances, where oppositional groups simply do not have any access to open political 
channels or any political rights and they usually face constraints, they might search for 
alternative channels which mostly is a public space to use it as a ground for their resistance, 
disobedience and express their dissatisfaction or raise their voice to reach their desired demands.  
According to evidence, urban streets are well-known particularly as a place for challenging the 
status quo by citizens of the MENA region 74. Some scholars define this phenomenon which had 
been seen many times in the Middle East and North Africa as a constant and influential aspect of 
contention, to express dissatisfaction in the region. Examples of this phenomenon are the Iranian 
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revolution in 1979, the uprising of dignity in Bahrain in 1994, the Iranian student movement in 
1999, massive demonstrations in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and many other countries in the region, 
in the current century 75. 
Similarly, according to the scholars, streets of MENA have the potential to change to a 
place for expressing objections, faking identities, and expanding solidarities. Moreover, there is 
always the possibility of transforming a small protest to a massive demonstration with the 
purpose of challenging the status quo. Thus, it is fair to argue that public places in the MENA 
have gained a new identity in the past decades which is first the common spot of conflicts 
between the system and the masses and second, the mediator of initiating and developing social 
and political conflicts. Additionally, urban spaces have another ability which is playing a 
strategic role in strengthening the cause of social and political reform. This ability would help 
them to play an alternative role in acts of contestation and negation like lobbying and awareness-
raising and as substitute channels for demanding change and reforms where the proper political 
channels like senates, parliaments, and institutions are ineffective. To elaborate more on this 
subject, I am going to review some of the recognized episodes of contention that have occurred 
across the MENA in the past decades and that have failed. 
One of the well-known cases is related to Bahrain uprisings which were during 1994-
1999. During these uprisings, about 1500 Bahraini activists, leftists, liberals along with Islamists 
joined forces, held a sit demonstration in front of the Ministry of Labor to demand democratic 
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reforms. However, at the end of the uprisings, their efforts were unsuccessful. Another case is 
related to the student movement of Iran in 1999 which occurred as the outcome of the attack by 
groups associated with the conservative parties to the Tehran University dormitory. During this 
movement, about 60,000 demonstrators which were mostly students and youths occupied public 
spaces of Tehran and other big cities to show their dissatisfaction with the system. Although, 
again their efforts in creating political and social reforms were fruitless since their petition got 
sabotaged by the people in charge inside the governmental and judicial branches, who were 
responsible to send the reformation bills for the vote to the parliament.  
 
3.2 Applying PPT Theory on MENA Cases 
 
Political process theory, in contrast to RMT instead of focusing on human and material 
resources available to social movement organizations, focuses on political environments. As 
mentioned before, the main emphasis of the political process theory is on structural conditions. 
As such, according to this theory what would pave the way for the formation of the collective 
action is the favorable political opportunities 76. 
Thus, the political process theorists argue that mass mobilization could be a reaction to 
opportunities that expose the weakness of the state to political pressures. Moreover, they believe 
that these types of opportunities that can generate mass mobilizations either exist or do not. Put 
differently, this theory assumes that political opportunities are preexisting conditions, and actors 
should only wait for the proper time to pursue them. 
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 However, this is the part that makes application of this theory, which is mainly about 
pursuing opportunities to mobilize, to countries with a closed authoritarian system like Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, or Syria, debatable. In these cases, and similar states in the MENA region, 
political opportunities are rarely present and if they are, government-specified them to prevent 
any questionable actions against the status quo. As such, members of oppositions or oppositional 
leaders who risk their lives by exceeding the narrow limits could experience consequences like 
detention, long term jails, and show trials or execution 77. As an example, it is possible to 
highlight the case of the execution of Sheikh Nimr in Saudi Arabia who was the supporter of the 
mass anti-government demonstrations that occurred in Eastern Province in 2011, where the Shia 
majority has a long history of marginalization.  
As a result, it is hard to argue that PPT theory applies to environments like the MENA 
region where oppositional movements rarely have access to an open opportunity to mobilize. 
However, as we witnessed the contemporary movements in MENA, lack of political opportunity 
in MENA led to the formation of movements with specific features. These features are in sharp 
contrast with organized and constant oppositional movements in the West. Yet, they are 
momentary battles, without well-defined leadership, clear ideology, or organized organization 78. 
 Hence, these features induce us to examine factors other than open opportunities and 
root causes of collective action which could lead to mobilization in the MENA. It is fair to argue 
that open opportunities as mentioned in PPT theory are not present in the MENA region. 
However, there are some examples of mobilization in this context such as the Iranian Green 
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Movement in 2009, where although the political space was so closed and no opportunity was 
provided by the state, groups of women, youths and students who were motivated by the unjust 
policies of the new administration and dissatisfaction with the election outcome, created the 
opportunities. Another example in Tunisia is what happened two years later than the Green 
Movement which triggered the happening of the “Arab Spring”. A young street vendor set 
himself afire in response to the confiscation of his merchandise by a municipal officer. This 
occurrence caused a massive demonstration in Tunisia and initiated the Arab Spring 
phenomenon 79.  
While many scholars argue that in these types of situations, demonstrators somehow felt 
obliged to risk their lives regarding the government’s behavior, others believe that in closed 
political spaces where the status quo is unfair, incidents of self-immolations could trigger the 
future mobilization and leave a mark on history.  
Based on the above discussion it is possible to argue that the mainstream theories of 
social movements that two of them have been applied to the case of MENA without exception, 
fall short of comprehensively clarifying the concept of mass mobilization. Accordingly, as their 
characteristics, we can point out to certain assumptions and West-centric tendencies which make 
them incapable to reckon the uniqueness of MENA cases. 
 
3.3 Applying New Social Movement Theory on MENA Cases 
 
Since the foundation of the new social movement theory is based on the Western 
technologically advanced and politically open societies, obviously the experience of the Iranian 
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and Tunisian demonstrators who were in the streets demanding change has no reflection on it. As 
such, the applicability of the new social movement theory with solid assumptions about the 
social movement is highly problematic to the cases of the Middle East and North Africa.  
Since a specific phase in the development of Western liberal societies led to the 
generation of the new social movement theories, different models of the theory mostly involve 
advanced capitalist, post-industrial or post materialist societies 80. 
New social movements theory formed and could be practiced in Western societies with a 
stable democracy. Even according to the concept of “levels of historicity”, the Middle East and 
North Africa lie within traditional societies, while Western societies, in the post-industrial 81. 
This theory argues that post-industrial societies with the highest level of historicity can produce 
cultural models. The reason is the distance that has been achieved by historicity from God, 
oneself, and the world as an object. In contrast, traditional societies that MENA lies in, still are 
in the middle of the way, being too close to God and thus so involved with religious challenges. 
Moreover, traditional societies are far away from creating cultural models that manage how they 
function 82.Although new social movement theory is known for its claims of universality, there 
have been a lot of caveats suggested by various scholars like Kurzman (2003) regarding the 
challenges of applying the new social movement theories to the contemporary movements of the 
MENA region.  
As the above discussion reveals, the new social movement theory which is framed and 
based on the experiences in Europe and North America got evolved along with the democracies 
 
80 Buechler, Steven M. "New social movement theories." Sociological Quarterly 36, no. 3 (1995): 441-464. 
 
81 Pichardo, Nelson A. "New social movements: A critical review." Annual review of sociology 23, no. 1 (1997): 
411-430. 
 





of the West and importantly, is established based on specific happenings in the United States and 
Europe.  
Many scholarly articles were referred to arguments and works of Huntington in order to 
explain the process of democratization, outcomes and consequences of the Arab uprisings by 
help of Democratization Theory. (Stepan and Liz, 2013) In contrast, some scholars try to explain 
the uprisings in the Middle East by criticizing the democratic transition theory and instead 
focusing on class forces and class analysis83. 
According to them, the success of Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings was related to the 
strength of labor movement in the country and significant role of workers themselves. This is 
what was not present in countries like Syria at the time of uprisings.  
Another group of scholars analyze the contemporary movements in the Middle East by 
help of Rentier State Theory84. According to them oil-based rentier governments are more 
capable in suppressing the governments and support them to stand against the popular uprisings 
and protest by using force. The reason is the nature of contemporary movements in the Middle 
East is totally different from what happened in the West in the past. Accordingly, although 
Western countries are well-known for creating and producing theories related to revolution, 
protests, uprisings and social movements in the world, Wester scholars admit that by using the 
existing theories, they faced with some shortcomings and even obsolescence for explain the 
happenings of the MENA region85 . 
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Yet, the literature related to theorizing events and uprisings in the Middle East is not so 
rich, and contemporary movements of the Middle East have been analyzed less 
academically.  Moreover, the fact is that most of the available research related to this topic have 
lacked a well-defined theoretical approach to analyze conditions, processes, and outcomes of 
these uprisings. What is common among all the available pieces is each writer just uses one or 
more variable for analyzing the Middle Eastern movements8687.  
This research, however, attempts to explain the uprisings in the MENA region by 
combining two categories of theories: structural analysis and political agency. In this way, there 
is going to be a more comprehensive research globalization, technology, and international power; 
leadership and relationship among states.by having a multivariable study. Reviewing the 
structure of state and political system; economic conditions; social and cultural trend, agency of 
elites, groups, classes, and social forces; military and ideological factors; the effects of 
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THE NATURE OF MENA MOVEMENTS 
The MENA region is a dynamic environment with unique challenges which are different 
from the rest of the world. Furthermore, the process and emergence of the events in this region is 
not like the other parts of the world. This region, due to its geopolitical condition and natural 
resources has been transformed to the heart of the world and was pregnant with some critical 
happenings in the twentieth century. The war between Iraq and Afghanistan and the Arab Spring 
are the most important ones.  
The beginning of the Arab Spring was from Tunisia, but it was able to spread all over the 
region in a short amount of time. In this vein, each of the Western and Eastern analysts have 
started to look at these happenings from their own point of view and analyze it based on their 
preferred theories. Majority of them just called these happenings the process of democratization 
and some of them called them the Islamic movements.  
However, what has happened in this region contained significant structural changes in a 
way that not only transformed the domestic political structure of countries, but also in the 
international domain created some major changes in the power exchanges and eventually led to 
sustainable effects. Under the influence of these uprisings and movements, people started 
practicing democracy and demanding independence in the domestic and international arena. Now 
the question is what the reason behind the uniqueness of these movements is and what makes 
them different with the other social movements and even the previous social movements in this 
region 88. 
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As we realized the theories of social movements either classic or modern, fall short in 
explaining the contemporary social movements in the MENA region. The main reason for the 
inapplicability of these theories on MENA’s movements could be the revision of the nature of 
MENA’s movements while theories of social movements either classic or new are west-centric. 
Moreover, among the little amount of literature which theoretically studies social movements in 
non-democracies or non-western societies the assumptions related to the social movements in the 
MENA region never got revised. In fact, there is no model or theory capable of describing the 
current amalgam of MENA and the formation of the fruitful social movements in it 89. 
Reviewing various social movements in MENA reveals this fact that they are classified 
as “exceptionalism” cases with religious roots, fundamentalist nature and far from anything 
considered to be idealistic or advanced (Utopian). Scholars like Tilly or Melucci, use terms like 
anti-democratic, anti-modern or reactionary for explaining MENA oppositional movements. 
Furthermore, the oppositional movements in MENA marginalized in the debate of Islamism and 
secularism while most of the scholars always refer to the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 as a 
turning point.  
However, the fact is the nature of the oppositional movements in MENA has changed 
while the environment in the MENA region is still far from utopia and democratization. The 
recent mass mobilizations in the MENA region were all about demanding human dignity and 
citizenship rights, freedom, justice, and good governance. The transformation of the oppositional 
movements in MENA is visible in the slogans of demonstrators, e.g. in Tunisia, “Tunisia, 
Tunisia, free, free, in Iran “Where is my vote?” and in Egypt “Enough”. Put differently, after 
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three decades, the transformation is obvious in social and political awareness of unrelated 
classes, religious and ethnic groups.  
The main reason behind the transformation of the nature of social movements in MENA 
is related to the demographic change as a matter of a region-wide baby boom which had started 
in the 1980s. In Iran, the beginning of Iran-Iraq (1980-1988) was equal to encouraging people to 
the expansion of their families by announcing a series of family policies, for national security 
reasons which caused a speedy population growth. According to the World Bank, in 2013 the 
population of Iran was 77 million with 60% under the age of 30 90. 
Additionally, Tunisia experienced a similar thing by the introduction of family planning 
programs in the 1990s which created a massive population growth. This occurrence transformed 
the country into a young nation which according to the World Bank, in 2013 the population of 
Tunisia was 10.5 million with 51% under the age of 30.  
The second critical reason related to the transformation of the nature of social movements 
in the MENA region is as a matter of population growth especially in Tunisian and Iranian cases, 
most of the population are youth which majority of them are university students. Additionally, 
students are the most cohesive and efficient group of activists. According to Huntington you one 
should search for the most consistent critics of the government at the universities 91. 
However, the important point is that most of the unemployment is among the educated 
class with a higher level of education. This became one of the main challenges of the MENA 
countries such as Egypt.  According to data it has been predicted that the current number of 
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unemployment which is about 415 million would reach to the number of 823 million people in 
2050. Accordingly, the growth number of unemployed youths would increase from 36 million to 
56 million in 2050, while the economy of the Arabic countries on average has a growth of less 
than 5% annually 92. 
According to the above table, the highest number of youth population is related to Egypt. 
This number has been increasing since 1985. The important point is that due to initiation of open 
economy policies and the presence of youths at the universities, the number of graduated youths 
is increasing. These graduated youths try to increase their awareness regarding the political and 
economic conditions of youths in other countries through the social media, and this is the 
precondition for creation of dissatisfaction. Thus, we should say that the main opposers of the 
government were unhappy and unsatisfied youths that were aware of the politics and economy of 
the country in contrast to non-educated people 93. 
Therefore, the main difference between the current generation and the previous 
generation is the level of their education. Additionally, the current generation is far from the 
traditional ideologies and are trying to push back any ideology related to the Arab, Islamism, or 
nationalism.  
Moreover, as a matter of this dichotomy, the main demand of the MENA youths is the 
termination of the old order and substitution of the traditional order with a new one which would 
recognize democratic and individualistic values.  This contrast between the new demand and the 
political awareness of people and the social and political context of the Middle Eastern state
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Table 2. Youth Population in Selected Countries 
 
Country Youth Population
94 (Per 1000 total 
population) 
Percentage of Youth to the 
Population Unemployment Rate 
 1985 2005 2025 1985 2005 2025 Male Female 
Bahrain 67 110 133 16 15 14 17 27 
Egypt 9292 15332 17862 19 21 18 21 40 
Syria 2123 4369 5176 20 23 18 16 36 
Tunisia 1530 2098 1614 21 21 13 31 29 
Yemen 1966 4497 7594 20 21 20 31 14 
 
  
Source: United Nations World Population Prospects: the 2011 Revision
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creates a new sociological context. This new context has two main features. Firstly, it tries to 
separate religion from politics and secondly, it defines a new sociopolitical plan for governing. 
Some scholars by analyzing the recent happenings in the Middle East argue that one theme was 
mutual among all of them which was the Islamic revival. Put differently, Islamic ideology which 
was initiated by the Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979 is transforming from the thoughtless 
collective action of following religious groups or clerics to practicing religion individually and 
differentiating the religious ideas. The youth generation of ME has realized that a paradigm shift 
from the old order to a new one is necessary to produce ideas, reinforce opinions and eventually 
initiate effective reforms.  
 In addition, this paradigm shift has caused a new mindset among the Arab societies that 
prefer democratic and open society instead of the radical and totalitarian ideologies, utopian 
paradigm, or retrospective beliefs. Yet, some scholars believe that this led to the tendency to live 
as a middle class in the public opinion which in contrast to the past is not just related to the 
middle groups but most of the poor people of cities and villages also have joined to this new 
mindset. This tendency to live as a middle class more than having an economic dimension, is 
related tendencies and individual and citizenship requirements. It is a new mindset that reflects 
the desire to live in a modern society along its democratic and civilian necessities. The middle 
class of the Arab countries were not an important segment of the society and often were under 
the influence of Islamic movements. However, the transformations of the society prove the 
growth of this segment and their demand for enjoying the rule of law, individual rights, civilian 
freedoms, and respect to the human dignity. This new mindset is gradually encouraging bigger 
groups of society to support democracy, civilian and individual freedoms, and rule of law. 





become non-legitimate in public opinion. It can be said, this mindset transformation and 
democratic and civilian demands are the reasons behind the expiration of totalitarian, non-
democratic ideologies.  
What has happened recently in the Arab world is that a big part of the public opinion 
prefers a government who respects rule of law, human dignity, and individual freedoms to 
abstract justice which just exists in the religious discourses. This is what proves the fading of the 
status of Islam and religious influential organizations among the society.  
Moreover, the other impact of this paradigm shift is distancing from the worldview based 
on hostility with the West in the name of Nationalism or Islam. Previously, civilians hardly 
believed that the West is the major enemy of Islam and the Arab world and most of the society’s 
entanglements are related to the conspiracies and Western policies. What we have witnessed 
during the Arab Spring and after it, could be a sign of formation of a new generation of social 
movements with the institutional differences but some tendencies of the previous decades  
persist 95. 
 For instance, critical changes which can be seen in demographic behaviors of women 
like the marriage age, fertility rate is the exact reflection of this significant cultural 
transformation are also noteworthy. 
There is no doubt that new technologies and social media platforms have changed the 
culture of spreading news and information. In this regard, MENA is also not an exception. The 
internet despite filtering plays a significant role in transforming the culture of MENA’s 
movements. The spread of information through social media and the circulation of regional news 
have some key impacts. First, due to the possibility of remaining anonymous most of the online 
 





publishers have no fear of expressing their thoughts and ideas even extreme or radical. Second, 
as mentioned earlier, the speed of spreading news and information is much faster. Also, there is 
the possibility of accessing websites from all cities in the region. (Moldovan, 2020)96 
Accordingly, most of the news which is published in newspapers and other journals is risky and 
would easily circulate on the internet. Thus, we can argue that the internet and social media are 
essential tools for framing political battles in closed political systems. Accordingly, the internet 
is the most influential option for interaction, communication, and mobilization of the social 
movements 97. 
Finally, successful online political activities could combine online grievances with the 
street protests. Although, some scholars argue that the internet would induce solitude in a way 
that people limit their fight to online activities, nonetheless, what we learned from the recent 
happenings in the Arabic countries was that for a region in which most of the media is under the 
strict control of the government and protests are not legalized, the internet is the best and most 
accessible channel for the interaction of the protesters 98. 
Based on the above discussion and the recent social movements in MENA now it is 
possible to conclude that in contrast to what is hardly believed, MENA cases are neither 
compatible with the dominant social movement theories and their presuppositions. Nor do they 
adapt to the term “exceptionalism” which is a perspective that has been used by scholars like 
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Melucci and Touraine for describing almost all the MENA cases as anti-movements with anti-
modern and regressive engagements.  
  The amalgam theme of the recent mass movements in the Middle East and North Africa 
highlights the necessity for theoretical revision and moving beyond the trans-historical models 
and general narratives towards models and theories which account for the exceptionality of 
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PREVENTIVE FACTORS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE MENA REGION; 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The manifest feature of the Middle East is the political history of it. Factors like the role 
of colonization, religion, culture, and tradition have been significantly impactful on the political 
structure of the region and have shaped this mutual fate. The disparate structure of the 
authoritarian regimes faced a dichotomy along with the globalization and the expansion of 
international political interactions. Thus, this dichotomy between the new and old order has 
caused many critical socio-political challenges.   
Some of the Middle Eastern states have started generating some reformation in their 
political structures for withdrawing this crisis. However, based on the historical background of 
the sociopolitical structures, these reformations have never been so practical. 
Having said that, one of the main issues of the region is the lack of democracy which is a hot 
topic among scholars. Although, there have been many efforts for solving this issue (lack of 
democracy in MENA), there was no luck so far. 
As such, this chapter tries to analyze and examine the obstacles to democratization which 
is the main reason behind the unique nature of the MENA and its movements. Also, it is likely to 
argue that lack of democracy is what could cause the failure of movements in the region if there 
is any. 
Democracy by its main definition, which is the outcome of a long and gradual process 
has emerged in few countries and in most countries is a new and imported phenomenon. Today, 
the importance of democracy is so high that some non-democratic counties try to take advantage 





concept of democracy has been transformed to one of the most important and at the same time 
ambiguous political concepts 100. 
Various political systems in the US, European countries, the single party states in Africa 
and the past and present communist regimes or even religious movements all call themselves 
democracy. This created lots of controversies among the different political systems to the point 
that many of the political systems just present themselves as a democratic system. 
Thus, the international organization of UNESCO, launched a conference in 1950 for 
clarifying all these debates regarding the concept of democracy with more than 50 countries of 
the world. 101 The important point of this conference was that all the participants were declaring 
that they have democratic system, but some of them stated themselves as the one and only 
democratic system. This conference proved that the definition of democracy in communist 
systems is far from the American or European countries. The Western systems at this conference 
believed that democracy means free election, freedom of press and media, freedom of political 
assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, equality, the right to oppose the government, 
the right to choose a job, the right to form free labor unions, the right to travel freely, migrate 
temporary or permanently and the most important one, being free from fear and dread 102. 
Nowadays all the democratic systems believe that the reason behind establishment of 
democracy is creation of political, cultural, and economic freedoms. These freedoms do not 
mean spreading financial, cultural, or religious corruption, but are necessary for flourishing the 
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abilities of all members of the society. A person should be the protector of the society’s interests 
and the society should be the protector of an individual’s interests. This requires cultural 
development and elimination of political and economic barriers 103. 
The Middle East is one of the regions that has not experienced as much democracy. 
However, not all Middle Eastern countries are in the same position. Thus, it is not possible to 
give the same rule for analyzing the level of democracy in all of them. Yet, this chapter aims to 
first review the features of developing democracy and later study some of the obstacles for 
democratization that are all present among the countries experiencing conflicts. 
 
5.1 Democracy Development Indicators 
 
The level and progress of democracy are different in various societies with democratic 
structure and system. Accordingly, there are specific features for conceptualizing and measuring 





Fair and free election in which the main decision-makers in government get selected by 
citizens. Yet, it is not possible to call any society with an election a democratic society. Voters 
should be able to decide freely and be safe from any governmental threats for voting specific 
people. In democratic societies, participation in elections is not mandatory. Although, in 
 






democratic societies all adult citizens, parties and groups (even anti-government) are eligible to 
vote without voter suppression104.  
 
5.1.2 Freedom of Political Groups and Parties 
 
Groups and political parties assume as one of the key features of the government and the 
bridge of interaction between nations and democratic systems. There is no doubt that democracy 
could only resist the continuous and active presence of political parties. Political parties in 
countries and the competition among them over more power and authority would encourage any 
party for trying to increase its acceptance rate and citizen satisfaction105. 
 
5.1.3 Distribution of Political Power 
 
Democratic societies emphasize on the power separation and interaction among the 
powers. In fact, this is one of the essential conditions for the formation of a democratic structure. 
According to Montesquieu (1977)106, who is well known for his theory of distribution of political 
power, liberty would be at its highest level, if all three functions of government- legislation, law 
enforcement, and adjudication distribute in different hands107. Parliament should be the reflection 
of people’s will and the government should be the executor. preventing any deviation from the 
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constitution is legislation’s task. Yet, although democratic societies emphasize the distribution of 
political power any of the functions of government should monitor other power’s operations. 
 
5.1.4 Fundamental Freedoms 
 
Freedom of speech, freedom of mass media, civil freedoms, freedom of thoughts and 
beliefs, equality of men and women and existence of equal opportunity in politics are all factors 
for measuring democracy. 
 
5.1.5 Social and Political Equality 
 
Equality of men and women and the existence of equal social and political opportunities 
are among the main features for measuring democracy. Revising the constitution law and 
applying it for securing people’s rights is another impactful factor.  
 
5.1.6 Independence of Political Systems 
 
    The independence of political systems is necessary for the implementation of social issues in 
the best possible way. Since nowadays social issues have become so complicated office cadres 
must be specialized. This specialty and necessity happen by a structural variety of political 
systems. Accordingly, this structural variety releases the system from any social, ethnic or class 
affiliations. Max Weber believes that the rationality of the political system is the best method for 










5.2 The Obstacles to Democracy 
 
The Middle East and North Africa are among the regions which have witnessed little 
democratic progress. However, not all the countries in the region are in the same position. Thus, 
it is not possible to generate the same argument for all of them. The obstacles to democracy are 
various and numerous and here I am going to point out to some of them. 
 
5.2.1 The Structure of Tradition 
 
The traditional structure in developing societies would create strong barriers in political 
growth and development path. However, the reason behind most of the political issues in these 
societies is the disturbing of the traditional structure by the growth factors. The rapid 
modernization would cause ruptures in society and politics 109. 
Rapid economic development along with the new values which have been created as a matter of 
modern technology put the traditional values against the new ones. The growth of civil 
organizations in developing societies has created dissimilar values than the traditional norms and 
beliefs recast among the young generation. Additionally, most of these values do not apply to 
traditional societies and are against them. 
The growth of societies with modern values has caused political growth among the 
middle class and increased democratic demands. Thus, acceptance of the Middle Eastern 
traditional structures has been challenged by these democratic demands. 
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However, most of the Middle Eastern regimes for maintaining their traditional authority not only 
have defended these traditional norms and structures but also by the help of ideological or even 
modern tools tried to strengthen them 110.  
In other words, Middle Eastern regimes are trying to represent their political or traditional 
ideology, based on power, as a sacred entity which the obedience of that is mandatory.  
However, some scholars believe that tradition is not always an obstacle to political growth and 
development but could sometimes be effective in the development of the societies. Thus, we can 
argue that a combination of some modern and traditional values could be so effective in the 
process of political development and weakening of the authoritarian regimes of the region 111. 
 
5.2.2 The Weakness of Civil and Cultural Society 
 
Civil society consists of social organizations, institutions and associations which are free 
from any governmental dependency and have a crucial impact on the formation of political 
power 112113. In a civil society, non-governmental actors, like political parties, social 
development associations, non-governmental organizations, business syndicates and some 
interest groups exist. These organizations have the potentials to solve many of the civilians’ 
issues and, they could work against the system blockades 114. 
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Thus, one of the factors that could prevent democratization in the Middle East is the 
weakness of civil society in most of the states in the region. Some argue that due to the presence 
of colonization in the past and lack of democratic regimes in the presence, currently, most of the 
Middle Eastern societies are not ready for the genesis of a civil society which could later bring 
democratization.  
We must admit that expect for the nature of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, 
there have been some moves towards the formation of civil society and the number is increasing 
each day. Nowadays, thousands of non-governmental organizations have become initiated in the 
Middle East which even some of them have challenged the governmental structures 115. These 
organizations have formed as a matter of economic development, population growth and 
increased expansion of the level of education. Unfortunately, although the number of these 
organizations is high in the region still, they could not reach the adequate strength and impact. 
 
5.2.3 Lack of Political, Social and Economic Development 
 
Democratic institutions would maintain among the nations that are ready to accept and 
exploit them. This preparation needs a level of economic-social and political development. 
According to the Humanitarian Development Nexus’s report, the Arab world’s gross domestic 
product of 22 Arabic states would not reach half of Spain’s GDP116. This report claims that the 
income of one-third of the nations of non-oil Arab states in the Middle East is less than 2$ per 
day. In most of these countries most people are below the poverty line and the minority on top of 
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it, which proves the authority of a specific level of society. The percentage of women’s 
involvement in Middle East politics is so low and only 35% of the seats in parliament are held by 
females. The level of literacy and awareness is so low in the Middle East in comparison to the 
rest of the world. For instance, in 1996 all the Arabic states with a population of around 300 
million, there were only 140 newspapers with 9.2 publications. While, at the same time, in the 
United States with a population of around 270 million there were 2939 newspapers with 111 
million publications and in East Asia 400 newspapers with 102 publications.  
In 2001, internet users were 50% of the population while in the Arabic countries it was just 6% 
of the population 117. 
Cultural poverty is one of the main obstacles of democracy or the government of people 
by people. When people are not aware of their rights for surveillance and intervention in social 
and political issues, they will not be able to either use their rights or defend it. As a matter of this 
unawareness, an autocrat or an authoritarian class would be able to dominate. 
 
5.2.4 The Compatibility or Incompatibility Between Religion and Democracy 
 
  Some scholars believe that the compatibility of religion and democracy is not possible. 
They argue that it is not possible to apply all the religious guidelines to everyone in democratic 
countries. Relatedly, there is much difference between religious and democratic values, and this 
could create incompatibility between democracy and religion.  
In other words, it is not possible to put religious and democratic guidelines in one basket. 
Some of the radical philosophers in the Middle East, emphasis on the incompatibility of Islam 
and democracy and argue that democratic definitions and processes are against the Islamic 
 






culture. Besides, they believe that the creation of democratic reformations is equal to abolishing 
the traditional religion and culture of the Middle East 118. They assume that Islam is the 
foundation of Middle Eastern people’s life and thus, there should be an Islamic government to 
rule based on Islamic law or Sharia. 
As such, based on the arguments of this group of radical Islamists, democratization could 
not happen in states with Islamic rules119. The reason is that in the democratic societies power is 
in the hand of people, while in Islamic societies people do not have any authority. For instance, 
in religious systems equality between men and women or female candidacies for jobs within the 
judiciary or the presidency itself might be impossible. There is another group of scholars who 
reject the theory of incompatibility of religion and democracy and have another perspective on 
this subject matter. They argue that all religions emphasize on equality as the most important 
principle of democracy. 
According to Tocqueville (1840)120, while democracy reaches a level of unlimited 
freedom and materialism, organized religion would be able to control people and prevent them 
from unethical acts by promising them heaven and eternality. 
This group of scholars also argue that some religious clerics with an extra understanding of 
religion can have an updated comprehension of religion. These clerics bring religion to the help 
of democracy and prove their compatibility. Accordingly, they believe that this compatibility 
already has been verified in modern democratic societies.  
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Majority of the people in democratic societies are supporters of religion, and churches and 
mosques are actively involved. According to the moderate religious philosophers, there is 
nothing in religious beliefs and doctrines that show their compatibility with the corrupt and 
authoritarian systems. With this perception, this group participates in the democratic elections or 
support democratic institution’s establishment 121. 
The reason behind the incompatibility of religion and democracy in the Middle East is 
that some of the Middle Eastern societies are still traditional and democracy for them is a new 
and unknown concept. In other words, economy, urbanization, modernization, technology, 
media, and existing organizations did not exceed the required level for the formation of civil 
society and the foundation of democracy. However, the liberal’s attempts along with some 
processes could pave the way for introducing democracy to the endemic and religious traditions.  
It is possible to argue that what could cause compatibility between religion and 
democracy is the separation of religious organizations -which are a part of the cultural 
organization- from the political organization. Put differently, the separation of religion from the 
government. This separation, which many of the religious and non-religious scholars supports it, 
would uphold religion and democracy 122. 
The majority of the philosophers believe that the combination of religion and politics is a 
dangerous amalgamation and could cause catastrophe for both religion and democracy. 
Moreover, witnessing the compatibility between religion and democracy in democratic societies 
highlights the fact of separation of religion from the government. Unfortunately, in most Middle 
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Eastern countries this combination exists and the majority of the region’s leaders, by improper 
use of religion, try to stabilize their political position. 
 
5.2.5 Structure of the Non-Democratic Middle Eastern Systems 
 
Monarchies and religious regimes are still existing in the Middle East region in the states 
like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen, etc. According to the Freedom House report in 2010, 
from the 22 Arabic states in the Middle East 15 of them are among the authoritarian regimes and 
the remained 7 states only have relative freedom 123. 
The political structures of these regimes were under monarchies for years with tribal and 
religious tendencies. Leaders of the Middle Eastern countries use these tendencies as their 
political philosophy for ruling and maintaining. These types of political systems prioritize the 
interests of individuals or specific groups over the rest of the society or country and avoid other 
layers of the society to intervene in their political structure. Thus, these types of systems 
recognize democracy as a major threat to the survival of their systems. These systems are always 
in battle with modernization and accept modernization to the level that lets them deploy it along 
with their benefits. Accordingly, in these systems social and political freedoms are allowed over 
conversations about random and minor subjects to distract the crowds 124. 
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According to Huntington (1993), the future of these regimes is dark because they are avoiding 
modernization and in fact, this avoidance only would make their legitimacy questionable, but 
also would weaken the pillars of their throne.125  
Authoritarian regimes always try to prevent democratization in the Middle East. 
Moreover, for preventing permeation of democracy into their authorities by monitoring social 
media and via intimidation, undercover police networks or even sometimes military. However, 
confronting the development of democracy as a matter of modernization is not always an easy 
task for authoritarian regimes. Thus, they must slow down the process of modernization 
sometimes or join the army or give them some leverages to prevent the damages. 
Other tricks of these regimes are threatening and marginalizing dissenters from society, 
increasing the costs of reformations, suppressing nationalist passion and supporters of democracy 
by representing them as anti-religion or westernized. Additionally, by falsifying the possibility of 
chaos as a matter of reformation they try to preserve the status quo 126. 
 
5.2.6 Rentier States 
 
The term “rent” defines revenues which are much higher than the normal income. In a 
broader context rent points out to revenues which are higher than the income which could be 
achieved normally 127. Some argue that rent is the revenue which gets achieve with no effort and 
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is in contrast with concepts like wage and interest which are the results of effort and economic 
accomplishments 128. 
Adam Smith assumes rent as a specific source of income that is different from other 
revenues such as wages and profits. This type of income could be achieved by a specific 
individual or group with no effort or special productive activity. However, in a healthy economy, 
profits and wages are the outcomes of the productive effort. According to Ricardo rent is the 
surplus or differential gain. Rent goes to the government’s pocket from the tax on exports, firms, 
and natural resources companies. Exploiting natural resources does not need too many human 
resources. Thus, the achieved income from the rent instead of getting split among the citizens 
goes to the government’s pocket. In this way, it is possible to call any government who achieves 
most of its revenue from external or natural resources a rentier state 129. 
One of the critical obstacles of democratization in the Middle East is the presence of rentier 
states in the region. Middle Eastern governments are active in most of the economic sectors and 
furthermore have authority not only on natural resources of the country but also on other 
economic sectors.  
The reason behind the creation of rent in the Middle East is the existence of a monopoly 
over the competition. Access to high revenues with no force for distribution most of it the 
interests to business and mine owners or human resources would help rentier states with 
economic-political independence in the country. Relatedly, they could make social classes 
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dependent on themselves and therefore shift the path of social developments in order to pursue 
their political interests 130. 
Some of the non-oil rich Middle Eastern states, receiving a significant amount of foreign 
aid(rent) regularly. For instance, Egypt after the Camp David contract has received 28 million 
dollars annually from the United States. In the oil-rich Middle Eastern countries, companies are 
dependent on treasuries since most of the government’s revenue is from oil. Moreover, since 
taxation is not the only source of the government’s revenue, the government is not responsible to 
the people and does not pursue political development. Michael Ross argues that there is a 
positive significant correlation between the higher individual and firm tax rates and 
democratization in countries 131. 
Plus, due to the high oil revenues, the rentier states for increasing citizen satisfaction 
sometimes offer several economic and social welfare services. However, they just offer services 
that could not create any threat towards them or is appropriate for upholding the status quo 132. 
Beblavy (2001)133 argues that in the Arab world, specific social and economic interests 
are organized in a way that could dominate the major sector of the governmental rent. In these 
types of rentier states, new layers of individuals and benefit groups get formed that they also 
would create another layer of individuals and benefit groups. As such, the economy would be a 
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hierarchy of rentier layers which the government is on top as the main supporter of all other 
rentiers in the economy 134. 
What is apparent is that the demand for democracy, social and economic development 
along with globalization is increasing in the Middle East. This fact has put authorities under 
pressure. Inefficient governments have caused massive dissatisfaction due to their tendency of 
reacting to people’s demands and needs. Although occasionally some of the states in the region 
pretend their applicability with democratic features, the truth is the main obstacle of 
democratization in MENA is the authoritarian regimes who try to uphold the status quo.   Most of 
the time, human wisdom is at a lower level than the decisions of leaders of Middle Eastern 
regimes. Thus, controlling these regimes is not possible through the civic organization, mass 
media, political parties, and NGOs. Democratic groups always get suppressed and threatened due 
to a lack of advertising tools and opposing the authoritarian regimes. In fact, lack of resources 
and advertising tools and continuous threats have slowed down the process of democratization in 
the region. Also, there is no consensus among the Islamic philosophers regarding the necessity of 
democratization in Islamic societies. To plant the seed of democracy in the Middle East, Islamic 
philosophers should create a logical connection between the new world order and religious 
thoughts by renewing Islamic ideologies 135. 
Each society grows differently and political engagement in each society would be based 
on norms, values, and historical condition of it. Some of these societies are getting close to 
democratization faster and some slower. However, it seems that MENA countries have faced 
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numerous difficulties in this way. To get rid of some of these blockades, it is necessary to 
increase the level of public awareness in the region to pave the path for reaching a civil society. 
Encouraging Middle Eastern regimes towards democratization and formation of efficient 
governments through free and fair elections along with economic growth and independent media 











CASE STUDIES; MECHANISMS OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN MENA 
So far, in the previous chapters, we have reviewed all theories of social movements and 
checked the applicability of some of the main social movement theories on the MENA region. 
Accordingly, we realized that theories of social movements, both classic and the new ones, fall 
short in explaining the formation and process of social movements in the MENA region due to 
its unique context. Moreover, since the presence of democracy is one of the key requirements for 
the formation of social movements and MENA has experienced no or little steps towards 
democratization, we reviewed the obstacles of democratization in the MENA region in order to 
learn about all the preventing factors and barriers of any reformation in the region. 
During the Arab Spring, between 2011 to 2013, some states were successful in the regime 
transformation while others failed. In this chapter, I am going to review some cases which were 
somehow successful among all other social movements in the MENA region to create some 
reform like Tunisia and Egypt along Bahrain which was not successful for achieving its demands 
and examine their similarities and differences. In this way it would be possible to present a 
model for describing the favorable setting and factors for the formation of a fruitful social 
movement in MENA. 
As we mentioned earlier after the Islamic Revolution of Iran none of the social 
movements in MENA were able to achieve their demands towards reformation and 
democratization due to the obstacles that have been mentioned in chapter three, ever since the 
Arab Spring. Since the Arab Spring does not have a specific leader or ideology, scholars and 
Middle East political experts were concerned about the factors and variables which have caused 





of these movements were so critical that the social and political structures of the Middle East 
somehow have changed and have brought a chaos and instability in the region 137138139. 
Yet, now the question is besides the nature of the MENA social movements that have 
been changed in the last decades, what was the reason that the Arab Spring started from Egypt 
and Tunisia and no other countries in the region? What features of these two states make them 
outliers among all other states in the region? What were the obstacles to success? Lastly, other 
than the main assumptions of leading mainstream theories regarding the resources and political 
opportunity, what other factors and variables could lead to formation of the social movements in 
the closed political environments? 
As it mentioned in the previous chapters, there are many theories related to social 
movements and revolutions. However, according to Goldstones (2001)140. All these theories just 
emphasize influential factors on stability or reformations instead of analyzing the process of 
movements. He suggests analyzing other critical variables such as the International system 
(economic, ideological, and military factors); interaction between the government, elites, and 
civilians; social movement organization; ideology, leadership, cultural identities; gender relation, 
besides the structural factors. 
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Other than the mentioned factors regarding the Arab Spring, Goldstone believes that the 
successful revolutionary movements in the MENA were the ones which could get formed in 
Cross-Class coalitions and this is what happened in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt.  
Although, since there is a debate on classification of the social movements in MENA under 
classic or new theories of social movements, Bayat (2013)141 suggests classifying the MENA 
movements as “Refo-lutions”. These types of movements in contrast to classic revolutionary 
movements happen so quickly and have a reformative, civic, and peaceful nature. Bayat argues 
that happenings in Tunisia and Egypt were post-Islamist movements since their demand was 
creating a democratic society based on justice. A society where religion and faith at the political 
level would combine with rights, freedom and democracy and generate a new form of 
government and society.  
Many Middle Eastern analysts have similar viewpoints regarding the uniqueness of 
Middle Eastern movements. Thus, they emphasize studying various variables at different levels 
of analysis to have a broader and more comprehensive understanding about the MENA 
developments 142143. As such, in this regard this research in an analytical framework is going to 
study internal and external variables at domestic, national, and international levels. 
With a meta-analysis of all the previous studies, it is possible to have a comprehensive 
understanding about the occurrence of the Arab Spring and happenings in three countries of 
Egypt and Tunisia and Bahrain. 
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Thus, first we are going to review the reason behind the formation of the uprisings in these three 
countries and break them more through the chapter by using examples related to each variable 
and the present challenges in the region. 
The beginning of the Tunisia uprising was related to the class division in this country. 
The sharp distinction between the upper and middle class manifests itself on December 17th, 
2010 when a youth called Muhammad Bouazizi light himself after an altercation, he had with a 
security policewoman for confiscation of his food stand. He did this because he was not able to 
pay his tax or bribe the police. Occurrence of this happening triggered the Tunisian middle class 
and made them aware of the level of discrimination and inequalities in Tunisia. After this 
happening, the massive uprisings and street clashes started all over Tunisia. This all led to 
overthrown of the Bin Ali’s regime on January 10th, 2011.144 
After Tunisia, Egypt entered a cycle of mass protests. Right after the January 25th, 2011 
which is the police day in Egypt a massive protest and contentious movement formed in the 
country and in the end, it led to overthrown of Hosni Mubarak regime on February 11th in 2011. 
The collapse of Bin Ali and Mubarak’s regime paved the way for the public awareness and 
formation of political transformation in the region and other countries one by one started to join 
the internal war.  
Sectarianism in Bahrain was the main reason behind the Bahraini dissatisfaction. The 
discrimination and marginalization of the Shia people which are the majority of the population in 
Bahrain by the ruling Khalifa family which are Sunni. The uprisings in Tunisia and Bahrain 
encouraged unhappy people to stand for their rights. The country faced with the unrest in 
February 2011. Demonstrators started to occupy Manama’s Pearl Roundabout demanding 
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democracy and an end to the discrimination against the Shia Muslim by the royal family. Now, 
after reviewing the main cause behind the spark of the uprisings in these three countries it’s time 
to dig in more to analyze the root causes and impactful variables that led to chaos in the region. 
By taking a theoretical position towards the previous studies, this research tries to gather all the 
mentioned variables in those studies and represents them in a macro-materialist format and in the 
end as contribution presents a comprehensive model for unfolding the crucial prerequisites for 
the formation of a fruitful movements in the MENA region. 
Yet, besides the structural factors such as economic conditions, military construction, and 
the position of the International system towards the social movements, this research studies 
catalyzers such as the role of groups and media which boost the process of formation of the Arab 
Spring and resource mobilization. 
In table 3, I gathered all the mentioned variables related to chaos and instability in MENA after 
reviewing 21 chosen articles.  
According to table 3, scholars who did research specifically related to the Arab Spring, 
pointed out one or multi variables as critical and effective. The most mentioned variables which 
have caused chaos and instability which eventually led to occurrence of the Arab Spring are 
related to two different categories. One category are institutional factors and the other consists of 
the facilitators. Variables in institutional factors category are economic crisis, inflation, 
unemployment (especially among the educated youths), massive poverty, dissatisfaction among 






Table 3. Factors Involved in Formation of the Arab Spring 








(specifically among the educated 
youths- Inflation  
Jamshidi, 2013145; Yadlin, 2013146; 
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Elhusseini, 2014151; Kinninmont, 
2012152 
Massive poverty Kinnmont, 2012153; Acemoglu 
&Robinson, 2012154 
Youth’s dissatisfaction Elhusseini, 2014155; Lynch, 
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Table 3. Continued 
Agent Type Factors Scholar 
 Social and regional inequality Lynch, 2011158; Esposito et al., 
2015159; Khosrokhavar, 2016160; 
Cammett, 2018161; Dalacoura, 
2012162 
Government corruption- Corruption of 
leaders and their closed relatives 
Acemoglu & Roninson, 2012163; 
Elhusseini, 2014164; Syed, 2014165; 
Marcobitz, 2014; Dalacoura, 
2012166 
Resistance of a tyrannical minority 
group in response to demand for 
political involvement 
Dalacoura, 2012167 
Long-term tyranny, lack of legitimacy, 
Systematic deterrence for reformation 
and attaining a new balance 
Omotola, 2012;168 Esposito et al., 
2015169; Thyen & Gerschewski, 
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Table 3. Continued 
Agent Type Factors Scholar 
 Experience of learning and indorsing 
democratization and understanding of 
proper conditions for urban protests 
Bayat, 2013172 
Facilitators Minimum presence of NGO’s and 
educational support networks such as 
“Muslim brotherhood” 
Dalacoura, 2012173; Yadlin, 
2012174 
 The role of civil society activists Khosrokhavar, 2016175 
 
 
of the society for preserving the status quo, long-term tyranny, lack of legitimacy and experience 
of learning and endorsing democratization and waiting for the proper time to apply it. 
Repeatedly, facilitators consist of a minimum presence of NGOs and educational networks and 
civil society activists. 
After reviewing the mentioned variables, we can conclude that there are four actives 
challenges in the MENA region. These challenges would literally cause division and breakdown 
in the population and would create different sub-groups. Later, these sub-groups will act against 
each other or they could even change to organizations or political entities.  
The main conflicts which are the feature of modern Middle Eastern societies have been 
created around these challenges and their institutionalization. All types of societies are faced 
with some sort of challenges. However, the type of challenges, their density and polarization 














by the present active challenges in it and accordingly the political consequences in the region are 
significantly related to these challenges.  




It has been more than 200 years that secularism slightly found its way through the Islamic 
world, specially its main sector (the Middle East) and became a dominant ideology in society and 
politics. Following the collapse of Othman empire in 1924 and its division to smaller kingdoms, 
secular governments have started to arise and rule one by one in these kingdoms. Thus, the 
impact of secular perspective and government was marginalizing religion, tradition, and religious 
authority 176. 
The Western or modern definition of secularism is being against any religious authority 
in the society and politics, getting worthless of any tradition and acceptance of wisdom as the 
solitary and independent source for all the decisions related to the eternal life 177. 
Appearance of secularism as a Western mentality into the Islamic World and its transformation 
to an ideology, created bipartisan and challenges in philosophical, social, and political processes 
and led to formation of two groups of supporters of secularism and Islamists 178. 
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Other than the fundamental opposition of Islamists with secularism, one of the main 
catalyzers of the Islamism-Secularism gap in this region is the reaction of the Westerns to the 
presence of the Islamists in the social realm. Regarding to the promotion of democracy, Western 
countries try to be marginalized Islamists in the political sectors and political stability in this 
region is prior to the challenging opinion of the presence of opposition groups in the political 
ground.  An example would be the full support of the Mubarak against the Muslim Brotherhood 
by the United States and Western countries, especially during the first decade of the 20th century. 
Put differently, promoting of the democracy by the US in Egypt was in a way that Islamic parties 
could not be involved in power and authority 179. 
In general, the MENA region with its extraordinary characteristics, undertakes any 
conflicts from the tradition vs. modernity point of view. As such, it introduces secularism as the 
representative of modernity and Islamism as the representative of the tradition. This is what has 
caused two different ideological bases, one in support of secularism and the other in support of 
Islamism in this region which has penetrated not only in the mindset of the people, but also in all 
the aspects of the people’s life in this sensitive part of the world. Accordingly, supporters of each 
side, blame the other for all the issues and lags and try to limit each other’s authority.  
Even this challenge was clearly visible in the studied countries in this research. As various 
groups like the active Islamists group of Tunisia, Ennahda party180 and Islamic Jihad or in Egypt 
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Jihad organization, Hizb ut Tahrir181 and Muslim Brotherhood, and in Bahrain Al Wahdavi and 
Al Ekha, oversee the Islamism movement.  
 
6.2 Economic Challenge 
Among the social challenges, the economic gap is one of the most common ones. 
Throughout history, ideologies like communism has emerged with the claim of eradicating this 
gap, but apparently, they did the opposite. Although this gap exists in most of the countries, the 
type and distance between its poles are different in different regions and administrations. The 
more distance would cause several social crises. The situation is a little bit different in the 
MENA region and has created a complicated condition. The dual economy, besides the dual 
culture have led to a massive gap and the outcome is a collection of the old social classes like the 
nobles, petty bourgeoisies, clerics and peasants against the new social classes like, bourgeois, 
intellectuals and the working class. However, it should be mentioned that the role of government 
is significantly important in boosting or diminishing the economic polarization among the social 
classes or even changing its whole path.  
Besides the dual economy, the other characteristic of the MENA’s government is the 
given natural resources (gas, oil, etc.), which transform the state to a rentier state. These given 
natural resources would change the government to a monopole with dominant power and control 
which does not care about the society’s benefits. However, at the same time, these types of 
governments try to attract and absorb elites and oppositions, by help of the money from the rents, 
in order to maintain their monopoly power. Rentier economy would create a rotary economy 
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against the manufacturing economy which the main point in it is having access to the rent and 
competition. While in the manufacturing economy wealth is based on working and effort, in the 
rentier economy wealth is the product of chance, accident, family and friends’ relationships and 
linkage to the authorities 182. 
The outcome of all these characteristics would be infrastructural economic problems 
which would increase the gap between the rentier groups close to the regime and other parts of 
the society. This gap which we can call the “central gap” exists in most of the Middle Eastern 
countries and in the long term would create tremendous problems like unemployment, inflation, 
inequality and the appearance of a huge gap between wealthy and poor.  
Egypt is the most populated Arabic country with a growing GDP. This growth even 
increased in the second half of the 2000 decade. As predicted, the constant growth of GDP in the 
90s had led to decline of the unemployment rate and malnutrition of the children.  
However, during the first years of the new century, besides the continued GDP growth, 
unemployment and children’s malnutrition not only stopped their decreasing process but also 
started to grow. Both scales had reached a critical point (malnutrition of the children from 20% 
to 30% and the youth’s unemployment rate from 205 to 35%). That said, in some countries in the 
MENA region, GDP growth had a negative effect instead of being impactful on the civilian’s life 
183. 
Inflation in Egypt has always been a structural problem. For instance, it has been more 
than 15% during the first decade of the 20th century and reached 18% in 2008. (UNDP, 2009). 
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About 4% of the people had a salary less than $2 and around 20% of the people less than $1. The 
unemployment rate was 9.4 in 2009 and 9.7 in 2010 in this country. The rich class was a small 
part of the society with a close relationship with the authority and Mubarak’s family. In fact, 
most people were below the poverty line, and the country was struggling with a huge economic 
and class gap. (Eslamee, 2016)184 
According to the heritage foundation the economic status of this country in 2012 is as 
follows: Egypt’s medium score of 59.1 for economic freedom is on the 96th spot among 176 
present countries. Ownership status is not at a great point in this country, official corruption in 
the economy is also present at a high point. According to this foundation, unemployment rate in 
2012 was 9.6 and inflation rate was 16.2 185. 
Tunisia is also one of the Arab-African countries that has experienced a great 
achievement regarding the economic scale after its independence. Relatedly, the world bank 
announced in 2000, Tunisia has impacted the economic improvement in the MENA region from 
the latest 1980s. Besides the economic development this country also impacted some corrective 
economic proceedings like privatization of the federal organizations, encouraging foreign 
investment, and cutting the subsidies during the first decade of the 21st century. 
However, a deeper look at the economic status of this country could prove lots of 
fundamental challenges. In fact, reformations have expanded during Bin Ali’s administration, but 
these actions doubled the economic inequality and made the poorer class’s life much harder. 
Although, these actions created many opportunities for the upper class and even caused the 
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benefits directly entered to the packets of elites and few connected groups to the government 
which eventually led to enlargement of the class gap and creation of distribution crisis. In other 
word, reformations process caused polarization in society and expansion of inequality 186. 
The class gap was so visible in this country during the decade prior to the revolution. 
There was a sharp distinction between the rich class who were lived in Tunisia’s suburbs and 
poor class who were lived in villages and other cities suburbs. (Benstead, et al., 2013)187 
Due to the specific attention and allocation of budget to education, the rate of graduation 
was so high in Tunisian universities in comparison to other countries in the region and the 
country had the highest educated youth population in the region. However, growth and education 
rate were not related to the job market or human resources requirements. According to the UNDP 
reports of human resource development plan in 2009, during 2005-2006, unemployment rate was 
27% in Tunisia while 65% of this number were youths. According to this report, the average 
unemployment rate reached from 13.6 in 1980 to 15.5 in 1990 and then to 27% in 2005-2006 188.  
According to the Heritage Foundation, Tunisia had the 100 rank in the world regarding 
the economic freedom. It continues, investors are not free in this country and they do not have 
any control over the credits. Business is more like a monopoly in this country and corruption in 
the administrative and economic system is massive. Unemployment rate is 14.7 in this country 
189. As for the Bahrain it is possible to argue that economy was one of the main reasons behind 
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the people dissatisfaction of the people in Bahrain: poverty, and unemployment. Bahrain in 
contrast to other Middle Eastern countries is not an oil-rich country with a vast amount of oil 
resources (except the gifted oil from Saudi Arabia). Accordingly, they ran out of the little 
amount of oil they had at the beginning of 90s decade. In addition, the financial aid from the 
other countries, especially Saudi Arabia all goes to the ruling family. Thus, the economic 
situation is not preferable for the people. 
The high unemployment rate has two main reasons: 
1- Low level of employment 
2- Massive presence of cheap imported workers in Bahrain190 
However, despite the undesirable economic condition, the country has an economic potential and 
has lots of advantages for absorbing foreign capital. The special business position, aluminum 
industry, petroleum and petrochemical industries, and other petroleum products are the main 
sources of export income. In addition, this country is one of the most important communication, 
telecommunication in the region. 
The middle-class youth and university graduates are two groups that were suffering from 
rising unemployment in the wake of liberal economic growth. The overall rate of unemployment 
before the uprisings was at 10% in Bahrain while the rate of young people was at least 25%. 
Moreover, the new labor market applicant just demonstrates about a third of all unemployed 
workers in Bahrain which is 62% and the minimum waiting time for a recent graduate to enter 
the job market is at least 24 months in Bahrain191. 
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It should be mentioned that Bahrain (Al Khalifa regime) has been the main ally of the 
Saudi Arabia among the Gulf Cooperation Council. This was a bilateral cooperation. On one side 
Al Khalifa regime needs Saudi Arabia support and on the other side, Al Saud needs remaining of 
Al Khalifa for stability of Saudi Arabia and keeping Shia’s of Bahrain on the sidelines. 
Therefore, the majority of Saudi Arabia’s cooperation with Bahrain is economically to 
maintain their influence on the Bahraini regime. For instance, for keeping Bahrain under its own 
authority, after depletion of oil reserves in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia offered 100,000 barrels of oil 
to Bahrain daily. In addition, after the 1994 crisis in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia assigned the full 
authority of Abi Safah oil veils to Bahrain which currently Bahrain can extract and export 
140,000 barrels oil from this veil daily. However, the problem is the country became completely 
dependent to Saudi Arabia and this caused massive dissatisfaction among the people. 
 
6.3 Tribal and Ethnic Division 
 
           Tribal and ethnic division is one of the traditional challenges which have been presented 
in the societies which did not finish the civilization period completely and thus it could create the 
groundwork for the social conflicts. The Middle East is so influenced by this phenomenon, 
although the tribal and ethnic division problem is not limited to just the MENA region. During 
the past decades, in countries like Yugoslavia, China etc., the status of tribes and minorities has 
become so clear. Moreover, this is a topic that the great powers have been considering for years 
and even making their investments based on it.  
In general, the MENA region consists of many tribes and languages, which all make this region 
so vulnerable. Thus, below I am going to examine this topic by reviewing four countries of 





The role of ethnic is so impactful in Egypt. In this country, Christians have chosen 
migration under the influence of the Arab Nationalist governments during the past 50 years. The 
number of Christians has decreased from 20% in 50 years ago to less than 10%. Christians with 
10% and population about 8 million are the second largest religious group after Muslims in the 
Middle East region. Although Christians are minorities in Egypt, the point is they have roots in 
the Egyptian history. There were times that different administrations were trying to implement 
divisive politics between Christians and Muslims in Egypt. However, during the administration 
of Muhammed Ali Pasha and Jemal Abd Al Naser, we have witnessed the politics of equality 
among all the Egyptians either Muslims or Christians. During the new era and administration of 
Anwar Sadat, again, Egypt started to be dealing with divisive politics. As a matter of fact, the 
conflicts between the Christians and Muslims were at its highest point at that time. Some 
examples are bombing and firing Eyn Al Shams, Al Mina and Al Obur churches during the 1990, 
1996 and 2002 years. Thus, some analysts believe that the roots of the recent uprisings and 
evolutions in Egypt is related to the bombing of Iskenderian church and death of a massive 
number of Christians. Put differently, these happenings created a type of convergence between 
the Muslims and Christians with the goal of battling Mubarak’s administration. 
After Mubarak’s administration, the conflicts between Christians and Muslims and 
Egyptian government were still going on. Thousands of people have been killed in these battles. 
Although, they announced shutting down of a church in Asvan one of the states in Egypt, there is 
no doubt that there were many other reasons such as existence of lots of tribes and ethnics in 
Egypt and their support for specific political groups was one of the main reasons 192 . 
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Libya is also a tribal and traditional country. According to reports there are about 120 
tribes and families in Libya with high influence in the society. Although, 30 of them are more 
active. Also, evidence shows that most of the wars in Libya are tribal wars 193. 
After WWII, Libya gained its independence (1952), while there were no political organizations 
or power in the whole country. There were attempts for formation of a government under the 
authority of King Edris (1952-1969) based on the powerful local families and tribal structure. 
Due to the boom of oil, some new types of economic support started to develop separately from 
tribes. New center of powers started to form beside the traditional tribal and relative structure 194. 
 However, with Qadhafi getting to power, the tendency towards tribalism started to 
increase. While he was so ambivalent towards tribalism, his ideas were closer to tribalism which 
weakened the nature of nationalism. Ideologically, Qaddafi rejected any political role for the 
tribes. However, he never rejected the role of tribes themselves and was using them as 
facilitators of social security and source of social benefits.  
Even, if the impact of any tribe lessened in 1970, tribes were still unofficially activated. 
As such, Qaddafi, started to support formation of new unification of tribes, especially against the 
big tribes in Cyrenaica which were supporter of King Edris, for protecting the revolution 195. 
From the beginning of 1990, while the Islamic groups were still competing against the regime 
and the beginning of the international sanctions, tribes were a pressure tool for getting rid of the 
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oppositions. Majority of the tribes were encouraged to announce statements against the people 
who betrayed the country. While at the beginning of 2011, tribes in north east of Cyrenaica first 
started to riot. On the other hand, Berber tribes from the west united rapidly and started to play 
an impactful military role in revolution same as the Tebu minority in south 196. 
In general, the tribal and ethnic division is one of features of the Libyan society and is what have 
prevented this country from transforming to a united nation and instead had led the society to a 
tribal division in the hand of authoritarian regimes. 
In this vein, the role of Qaddafi is so obvious as some who exacerbates this happening. 
He did this by gaining the support of some tribes and eliminating some others. Even, in the 
revolution in this country, this division became more obvious after the support of some of the 
tribes of revolution and some others of Qaddafi. 
Besides the two previous countries, Yemen is also a traditional society where the 
behavior patterns of people are under the impact of its tribal structure. According to Burrowes 
(2008)197, the remaining heritage of Yemen’s independence is tribes and military which currently 
both organs are the foundation of this country actively and with stability. Tribes in Yemen after 
its independence, were always one of the powers which entered the political era along with the 
military powers. Moreover, their goal was either keep or change the status quo by acting against 
the opposition which were under the protection of other tribes. Some examples are after the 
independence of this country from Ottomans in coups of 1955, 1945, 1962 and 1967 198. 
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Tribes play an impactful role in Yemen. They were always one of the incompatible 
powers against the foreign intervention, like the resistance of the tribes against the England 
colonization. On the other hand, these tribes were tools for influence of other countries like 
Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has an old and traditional relation with Yemeni tribes and supports 
them financially and with weaponry.  
Since 1962, Saudi Arabia has been trying to control Yemen with a tribal republic that has 
a weak political structure but at the same time, strong tribal structure. According to Burrowes, 
the most important outcome of the Saudi Arabia’s strategy against Yemen is spreading tribalism 
in all the organizations, especially the military. Accordingly, this tribalism was more beneficial 
for northern tribes and not the southern ones199. The dominance of the tribal beliefs and ideas on 
the society’s culture is what would create internal ethnic and tribal conflicts. Sometimes as a 
matter of tribal conflicts regarding a piece of land or social issues, business or etc., or even 
personal issues, in the case of tribal killings; And this would lead to tribal killings. Head of the 
tribes believe that these happenings are all the result of lack of law, weakness of justice and 
dominance of tribal beliefs. (Aliboni, 2011)200. This situation would also decrease the 
government’s authority at national level and increase the influence of the tribal leaders in the 
political structure.  
Saleh’s regime was one of the regimes after the 1962 revolution, which actively was 
trying to empower the political power of the tribes and support them. According to Khaled, this 
behavior could increase the gap between the ethnics and tribes and put them against each other. 
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On top of that, the presence of the Zaidi Shias and Houthi’s tribal rebellions might be the most 
challenging outcomes of the ethnic and tribal division in the Middle East. 
Tunisia, similarly, to other Middle Eastern countries in regards to ethnicity, has a 
heterogeneous society. Although it does not have a sharp ethnic division in comparison to the 
other Middle Eastern countries, since it was the destination of many immigrants throughout 
history, it has ethnic diversity. Although the majority of Tunisian are Arabs and Sunni (99%) but 
according to the genetic research, the ethnic population of Tunisia is not homogenous and is a 
combination of various races that migrate to North of Africa, from Asia and Europe. As such, 
people who live in North of Tunisia are a mixture of Barbarians, Roman, Vandals, Cartagena, 
and Arabs. While the people in middle and south parts of Tunisia are more Barbarians. In fact, a 
complex of various ethnics with different cultures are living together, that due to the traditional 
pattern of the society, have divergence potential 201. In a nutshell, the current Middle East looks 
like a 40-piece ball, that each of its countries are influenced by their ethnic divisions, and in 
between, the unreasonable actions of the governments would sharpen the gap and create severe 
polarization. 
Among all the involved countries in the Arab Spring the case of Bahrain is unique 
regarding the sectarianism and ethnic division. On one side there is a sharp discrimination 
between the Al Khalifa family and their relatives with the rest of the society and on the other side 
the widespread religious discrimination between the Shia and Sunnis. While the majority of the 
country are Shia (60%), the ruling family are Sunni. There are two divided society in Bahrain: 
one is the society of rich ruling family, diplomates, business owners and the other one the poor 
society which contains people in poor neighborhoods and suburbs. Al Khalifa family members 
 






are always prior to others and there is not such a thing as meritocracy. Additionally, in the 
Bahrain society the distinction against the Bahraini Shias is the point which they were always 
under the discriminatory behavior and being marginalized by the ruling system. This in fact has 
caused a serious dissatisfaction for the Bahraini Shias which are the majority of the society. 
 
6.4 The Administrative Challenge 
 
One of the most impactful challenges on the political culture of the Middle East is the 
presence of the military in the political arena of the countries of this region. The special 
privileges of the military members in politics and the fear of occurrence and formation of a coup 
in these countries, have made the process of democratization problematic. Moreover, because the 
existence of a complete democracy in a country has a negative relationship with the reduced 
military’s power, the political process of this region, has been moving towards an incomplete 
democracy during the 20th century and the first decade of 21st century 202. 
This challenge has created a vicious loop in the domestic politics of Middle Eastern countries, 
which by moving of the military towards the political arena, the half space of the civil society 
gets closed and with the moving of civilians towards taking this position back, the military 
members are driven back to the camps and military centers. This process is what is happening in 
most Middle Eastern countries. 
There are various arguments about the presence of the military in the political arena. 
Jowitz believes that interference of the military is one cause of political instability. The more 
military intervention, the more political instability. On the other hand, Huntington and Pearl 
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Muter argue that the formation of institutions (partisans, legislative parliaments) would reduce 
military intervention. Huntington by arguing about the excessive or abusive political influences 
of the armed forces in a country states that, praetorianism is one of the features of a country that 
not only the military but also other social members intervene in the political affairs. The reasons 
that pushed the military towards political intervention are hidden in the society’s structure. These 
reasons are mostly related to the lack of weakness of the political organizations 203. 
The presence of the military in the political arena has a long history. However, this specific 
status of military in MENA forms as a matter of the role of military in independence and 
government building in these countries. The military leaders of Egypt (1952) and Libya (1969) 
took power by coup d’état. Although, what is clear is that in majority of the MENA countries, 
the military is loyal to the regime instead of the nation or the democratic system 204. 
In Egypt, among the 18 cabinets which had formed during the 1952-1970 years, only 
leaders of one of the administrations which remained less than 2 months were not military 
members. Only 3% of the first cabinet consisted of non-military officials and the next 15 
cabinets were all combinations of about 36% military and 64% civilians. Accordingly, the most 
critical positions offered to the military members. Naser was chosen for leadership 8 times and 
all the president’s deputies during Sadat and Naser’s administration were military members. 
Enterprises of all the major ministries and presses like Al Ahram or Al Helal were in the hands 
of the military members. According to Carothers, 2002, Egypt entered a gray political zone after 
the 90s which its main features were a limited political space for different parties and the civil 










government, supporting of the weak organizations by the government and political interfering of 
the armed forces 205. 
The presence of the armed forces in the political arena and the military-civil society gap 
is clearly visible in the recent years in Libya. The way that Qaddafi took power, and the way he 
treated the military during his administration, all show the bold role of the military and armed 
forces in the society and lack of even half-space civil society in this country. He owed his power 
in Libya to the military’s 1969 coup. In this year, some of the military officials ousted Edris by 
the order of Muammar Qaddafi who was 27 at that time, and later formed 
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 206. During his administration there was no civil 
society. The political system of Libya at his time instead of relying on the civil society, parties, 
groups, and political institutions was based on the military and tribal support, completely 
authoritarian. Formation of parties and civil society was forbidden, and oppositions got 
suppressed by the military207. He was so against the civilian organizations, which he believed 
regarding the parliaments that it is a hoax against the nation and the parliament regimes are using 
cheating tricks for solving the democracy problem. Moreover, regarding the public elections he 
believed that it is a trick and something like a modern dictatorship 208. 
Qaddafi, with all these assumptions, started to exclude all the opposition groups and other 
civil groups by help of the military and armed forces during the 1980-1990. The role of security 
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powers was so bold in excluding the civil groups in Libya, that they sometimes traveled abroad 
to eliminate opposition forces. In the meantime, what is visible in Libya after Qaddafi more than 
the previous administration, is the increased role of armed forces and decreased security after the 
revolution. As such, it is possible to argue that this is what led to sidelining of civil society, or in 
other words, under shadowed it by growth of the military after the revolution.  
In Tunisia, the role of the military for domestic security and elimination of the political 
opposition groups was so critical from the independence of this country till 2011. The military 
was the main trustworthy organization and was the perfect tool for political manipulation and 
advancement of the authoritarian regime’s goals. The political manipulation of the military 
became clear, particularly during the first decade of 1970, with suppressing the anti-government 
demonstrations. Since the officials of this country had no role in the government formation or the 
independence movement, like the leaders of the neighbor countries, they did not have a 
charismatic image and thus, were so dependent on the military. The military from the end of 
1970 and the beginning decade of 1980 tried to suppress all the unions and Islamic groups with 
the help of security forces. 
On the other hand, Bin Ali’s kind of coming to power in Tunisia, clearly shows the 
impactful role of the military in the political arena. He took power in 1978 by help of the military 
and coup d’état and by ousting Habib Bu Raghibeh, the first Tunisian leaders after the 
independence. Due to his security background and support of the military for taking the power, 
during his 23 years of authoritarian rule, he let the armed forces and security forces occupied all 
the positions and departments,  
Although, after taking power, he announced that he will decrease the political role of the 





reformations, during his administrations he could not fight against the massive influence of the 
military. As such, the military and armed forces suppressed many of the civilian forces like the 
Islamists, the liberals and unions and forced them to abandon the country.  
Bin Ali believed himself as a civil reformer, while under his administration none of the 
lefties or Islamists had any rights and were under attack frequently 209. 
Moreover, the government was under the order of the military and based on their demands was 
violating the citizen’s rights, limiting freedom of speech, presses and communications by using 
force and fear tackles. A set of actions like the judiciary system, traveling controls, arbitrary 
arrests for weakening the human rights and apposition groups in the end caused the Amnesty 
international organization to accuse Bin Ali’s regime for human rights violation in 2010. (U.S 
State Department, 2010) 
The West’s support of the military of this country had a massive impact on the human 
rights violation and decrease of the civil freedoms and elimination of the civil institutions. 
Tunisia was among the 10 countries that was on the top of the US’s list of sale of military 
weapons after 2002 for preventing terrorisms. The United States named this country during the 
Bin Ali’s administration as a key country for preventing terrorism. Supplies and facilities which 
the U.S gave to Tunisia since 2003, all display the growth of militarism and the increased role of 
the military in politics, especially the civil arena. The U.S sale of military weapons to Tunisia 
was consist of helicopter, machine gun, parachute, body armor, night vision device for snipers, 
drone and etc. 210.Tunisia was among the 20 countries which has received international military 
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education since 1994. In addition, the amount of the funds for the U.S military aid to Tunisia 
2008 was 21500 million and in 2009 was more than 23800 million dollars. (DSCA, 2011) 
In 2003, Tunisian parliament passed the inclusive anti-terrorism law. After passing this 
law, about 2000 people arrested for terrorism. These actions caused the critics to argue that 
demanded freedom is equal to terrorism in this country 211. 
In general, during the 23 years of Bin Ali’s administration, the civil society got destroyed step by 
step by the armed and security forces. The parties, NGOs and various medias were 
overshadowed by the armed forces activities and the military was suppressing any democracy 
process by calling it terrorism. 
The position of the military in Yemen is related to the critical role of its members during 
the independence of the country from the ottoman. In Yemen, the regime was on the one hand 
dependent on the military for maintaining itself and on the other hand was worried about the 
coup d’état from the military side.  
The weak economy, the tribal and torn structure and the weakness of the organizations all 
were amplified the need for the military to deal with the society 212.The growth of the military at 
the beginning of the independence, led to occurrence of continued coups in the next decades and 
transformed the country to a country which uses military response for any democratic political 
actions and elimination or suppression for any civil movements. The continued coups in Yemen 
all prove the dominance of the military in the political arena and the weakness of the civil 
organization in leading the social and political processes. The set of formed coups in Yemen 
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displays the sharp gap between the military and the civil society and in general dominance of the 
military on all the social aspects. Examples are the 1948 coup which led to assassination of 
Imam Yahya by an Iraqi. Later, Abdullah Bin Ahmed became the leader. On the side, Imam 
Yahya’s son in response to the 1948 coup, entered Sana’a and executed all the people involved 
in the coup by help of his tribal supporters. Again, an unsuccessful coup happened in 1955 by Al 
Talayeh, which happened again in 1962 by Abdullah Salih by help of the Egyptian forces. The 
outcome was the end of Imam Ahmed regime and the start of Yemen republic system by 
Abdullah Saleh 213. 
After the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces from Yemen, there was another coup by the 
tribes’ leaders and the military against Abdullah Saleh in 1967 which led to ousting of Saleh and 
Ghazi Alriani the only non-military leader of Yemen took power. However, as a matter of 
another coup in 1974, Ibrahim Al Hamdi took power. He was a military guy with modern beliefs 
which was insisting on marginalizing the tribal forces and improvement of independence of 
national sovereignty. He believed that the military is only a national organization. As such, he 
started to eliminate all the tribe’s leaders. After 3 years he got killed by the Saudi Arabia’s order 
and the military took the control of capital. After the alliance of both north and south Yemen and 
formation of the current Yemen, the first president was again chosen from the military members. 
This was again the beginning of the conflicts between the southern and northern forces 214. 
As for Bahrain, since the country was so weak regarding the military defense and 
security, it was obliged to make military agreement with superpowers. One of the most important 
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ones was the military agreement with the United Sates and offering the Al Jafr military base to 
the United States in 1971. This base was built by English people in 1935 and after they exit it 
was given to the United Sates in 1971. Other than that, the United State has two more military 
bases in Bahrain, and for this reason thousands of American soldiers are living in Bahrain with 
their families. All these are the reasons behind the separation of military and the civil society in 
Bahrain and Bahraini people’s dissatisfaction.  
However, what is worth mentioning is the military’s intervention is what is destructive in 
the MENA region. According to Huntington it is a preventive interference. He argues, there are 
two types of military interference. The first one happens at the times when the matter is the 
potential or close winning of a party or a movement in election or when the winning party is the 
representative of a group which the military wants to keep away from the political arena. 
The second one happens when a regime starts performing radical policies or relies on groups 
which the military does not want them to become powerful 215. 
However, eliminating the civil society and parties and organization, is the outcome of the 
military’s activities in the Middle East. 
Yet, this research aims to suggest a new model by presenting other impactful factors 
regarding the proper way of analyzing MENA movements and revolutions. Thus, a multi-level 
and multi-variable analysis is what will be used in this research to analyze happenings and 
reforms in Tunisia and Egypt which were the initiators of the recent movements in the MENA 
region and were successful in achieving their demands for the time. Theoretically, this research 
will use a macro and materialist approach for analyzing the conditions which the Arab Spring 
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occurred in. The mentioned approach will put “political process theory” and “resource 
mobilization theory” at the center of analysis.  
This research theoretically believes that Tunisia and Egypt had similar structural 
conditions which at a historical moment and as a matter of one or multi catalyzers led to the 
street protests. These street protests were strengthened by facilitators and formed an uprising 
movement and eventually with the help of some key determinant factors the reformation 
occurred. The used variables in the analysis will be mentioned shortly. However, the case was 









My research is based on a comparative case-centered method. With this method, I am 
going to analyze political, economic, social, cultural, military, and international factors involved 
in the occurrence of the Arab Spring. The combination of these factors is what is important in the 
positive or negative outcome. Relatedly, these factors all have impacts on each other positively 
or negatively.  
The main hypothesis for selecting these three cases is that the presence of some 
similarities between Tunisia and Egypt has caused these two countries to become starting points 
of the Arab Spring and not the other countries in the MENA region. Accordingly, Bahrain is 
chosen as an unsuccessful case with some unique features which this combination would be 
helpful in generating the most impactful variables on variation of the social movement outcomes 
in MENA. As for the cases, with the help of the results of chart 1, the similarities between three 
countries will be reviewed. Moreover, I have added 9 more factors which I found critical in 
causing and evolving the Arab Spring will be discussed in detail.  As for the institutional factors 
other than the studied variables in the previous research related to the Middle East, I have added 
4 more variables. 
For facilitators I studied the role of labor unions and NGOs along with the role of culture 
and social media. Moreover, I added another category of determiners, factors which in my 
opinion could have a significant impact on determining the direction of the MENA social 
movements. They are the leader’s performance at times of crisis, police forces and military 
position and lastly the foreign intervention. 





1- Clash between expectations and reality 
2- Public’s distrust in government 
3-  Sedimentation of the present ideology  
4- Social, political, and economic instability 
• Facilitators:  
5- The role of oppositions 
6-  Role of culture and social media 
• Determiners:  
7- Leader’s performance at the times of crisis  
8- Police forces and military position  
9- The foreign intervention 
Thereafter, the correlation between the mentioned variables will be examined by help of the 
selected cases of Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain and later the results will be stated.  
 
 
7.1 Institutional Factors 
 
7.1.1 Clash Between Expectations and Reality  
 
One thing that became a critical issue in Tunisia and Egypt in long term was feeling of 
humiliation and relative inequality216. “Enough” movement occurred as a matter of reaching 
serious proportions of handling problems and chaos all over the society and also the “Dignity” 
movement was a result of humiliation feeling among the people. People were annoyed since they 
have not had a proper answer to their needs and demands in the recent decades. Moreover, the 
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international system did not treat them well as a Muslim or Arab specifically after the September 
11th incident 217218219. 
Regarding the poor economy as one of the critical structural factors of the Arabic 
revolutions it should be stated that although during the years prior to the Arab Spring, Tunisia 
and Egypt both had experienced economic development 220, but the level of relative deprivation 
and dissatisfaction among the youth have been increased between 2009-2010 years and thus, the 
level of their happiness has been decreased 221. Relatedly, during the years prior to the 
revolution, there was no increase in national income in these countries by means of better split of 
the incomes as a result of increased poverty level due to the massive corruption and social 
inequality in the society 222223224. 
According to the Gallup survey, the number of people who felt prosperous and lucky in 
2010 in Tunisia and Egypt decreased in comparison to 2007. In addition, the lowest level of 
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satisfaction was related to these two countries beside Syria, Morocco, and Yemen among the 
Arabic countries in the Middle East. (Amin et al., 2012)225 
As such, it is possible to argue that the formation of the protests was for purposes like 
maintaining dignity, justice, and elimination of deprivation 226227. 
In a nutshell, it is fair to argue that a combination of factors like political limitations, lack of 
freedom, long experience of economic pressure with increased relative deprivation feeling and 
formation of corrupt regime mindset, among the people, were all created the foundation of a 
considerable controversy. 
 
7.1.2 Public’s Distrust in Government 
 
As much as the importance of people’s basic rights, feeling of freedom and the benefits 
of citizenship rights are significant too. Having a full stomach, without feeling free would lead to 
dissatisfaction. That is why many believe that putting legitimate freedoms in danger, in the end 
would jeopardize livelihood in the society 228. The turning point was the time when people 
became aware of the corruption of the officials. The gap between rich and poor was increasing. 
People started to believe that officials only cared about their own benefits and just used people as 
a tool for reaching their own targets. Presence of defiance potential, humiliation and feelings of 
deprivation reached the point that the corrupted image of leaders like Ben Ali, Mubarak, 
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Gadhafi, Assad’s family and Ali Abdullah Saleh shaped in public minds and people started 
blaming them for mishandling the political power and fraud. Yet, this was not far from the 
reality. 
As for Ben Ali, according to wiki leaks in 2006, about half of the Tunisian business elites 
were in direct contact with Ben Ali himself. In addition, “The family” in the political culture of 
Tunisia was known as a financial network which was family based, Ben Ali’s 3 oldest sons, 7 
grandkids and 10 brothers in law 229. This situation was ongoing, while the unemployment rate  
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According Banaszak231, successful revolutionary movements are usually those which 
form cross class coalitions. Regarding the political structure in Tunisia and Egypt and the role of 
government in economy and society, during the uprisings lower- and middle-class people 
mobilized against the government and religious leaders and intellectuals joined them. Massive 
corruption and bribery of the government and related officials were always presence (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2012)232. Despite the massive poverty in Tunisia and Egypt, the judiciary and 
people were always among the accusers 233. Mubarak, however, lost the support of most classes 
except a part of the upper class. Moreover, after the self-immolation of Bouazizi234, many people 
started blaming Ben Ali and his relatives. 
Mubarak and Ben Ali at the beginning of 2011, saw themselves completely alone in front 
of the wave of revolutionaries since their social support was just limited to a small part of the 
society. Bahrain has a long history of government’s fake promises to Bahraini people. In 2001 
the king promised to respond to the oppositions demands in a referendum. However, the king 
reneged his promises. Again in 2002 he announced a new constitution in which he centralized 
power in his hands. Although this constitution brought parliament to Bahrain but at the same 
time it manipulated the system. It literally manipulated the constituencies, so that the opposition 
votes were somehow trifling. In other words, the parliament made the king’s existing power a 
triple veto system. Later, the government naturalized large numbers of poor Sunni Arabs from 
Syria, Jordan, and Yemen in order to marginalize the Shias of the country which were 70% of 
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the population. Accordingly, they hired lots of non-Bahraini people for creating a secret army to 
be prepared for future challenges. As the years went by the political naturalization decision of the 
government created serious negative impacts such as unemployment, increased sense of 
xenophobia among Bahrainis and higher demands for homes and essential needs which were 
already far from reach of the working class.  
Additionally, lots of the king’s family controversies began to leak to the public. The most 
scandalous one was related to the transaction between the prime minister and a businessman. 
When all these happening became public knowledge people realized the government has no 
intention in in reforming the rigged political system. The happenings strengthened the distrust of 
people in their own government and a lot of anger and annoyance began building up which 
eventually, sparked the unrests for standing against the government to achieve the old demands. 
However, after the occurrence of the unrests, the protesters were suppressed by security guards 
and the secret army in March 2011 when the king declared a state of emergency. He brought 
troops from Sunni-led neighbor countries to restore order and silent dissent. The uprisings led to 
death of at least 30 civilians and 5 policemen, and arrestment of about 3000 people. 
 
7.1.3 Sedimentation of the Present Ideology 
 
Political ideology like any other novel social phenomena after becoming institutionalized 
could lose its influence and inspiration in time. Thus, all the efforts for preserving it could be 
impractical. This is what Edmond Husserl calls “Sedimentation”. Put differently, sedimentation 
occurs while a social phenomenon, belief or ideology turn into an unchanging routine and do not 
trigger any sensation 235. 
 






At the time of sedimentation, the current ideology would be at a point where there is no 
practical action against or in support of it. As such, the ruling system would try to preserve the 
status quo outside that ideology by help of tools like force, violence, or any other mechanism. At 
this phase, the ruling system would be in danger since its ideology will lose its resource 
mobilization power and the regime’s strength for confronting the internal and external threats 
will decrease. 
It seems that during the recent decades, especially after the Camp David treaty on 
Sep17th 1987, Arab nationalism ideology entered the sedimentation phase. In fact, during the 
last decades, rulers of states like Egypt that were mobilizing by relying on Israel, Arab unity, and 
nationalism in order to convince people to support them, have lost their former strengths and 
tools. 
Additionally, the collapse of Iraqi Ba’athist regime in 2003 and the beginning of the 
proxy wars in the region in which Iran and Saudi Arabia were the main players of it, have 
lessened the strength of Arab nationalism and impacted religion and sectarianism. 
One of the critical weaknesses of the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes was the lack of religious and 
ideological backup in the absence of legitimacy and democratic mechanisms. With the start of 
intense street conflicts in Egypt and Tunisia between the people and government forces at the 
pick of legitimacy crisis, no one had the ideological power to defend any of these two and there 
was no volunteer for sacrificing his life, social and economic benefits for Ben Ali or Mubarak. 
Ben Ali was not able to count on anyone’s ideological commitment and no one was there for 
Mubarak after he got ousted and feared to remain in the country. 
Generally, it is fair to argue that the ruling ideology in Tunisia and Egypt by no means 





joined people in the movements or at least did not defend the government. In Tunisia, religious 
group of Al-Nahza by Ghannouchi leadership and in Egypt Muslim Brotherhood supported the 
revolution and later Salafist groups also joined them. 
 
7.1.4 Social, Political and Economic Instability 
 
Tunisia and Egypt both have an economy based on tourism. As such, any chaos and 
insatiability in these countries would affect the number of tourists and the government’s 
revenues. At the time of instability, the maintenance fee of the political system would increase, 
and the government would not be able to resist so long against the reformation waves. The 
reason is these types of regimes do not have enough financial resources for keeping the military, 
security, and enforcement forces in the scene. Moreover, they would face difficulty in paying the 
government employees which could also impact dissatisfaction. This scenario is different in the 
rentier states. 
During the instabilities known as the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia injected funds to various 
sectors of society, gave benefits to employees, increased the amount of loans, hired about 60,000 
new forces to the Ministry and assured construction of 500,000 houses for poor people, and as a 
result not only ran-away from the contentious cycle but also guaranteed its own security 236237. 
This was exactly what Mubarak and Ben Ali’s regimes were deprived of. 
In fact, the chaos was originating from the non-oil states. It is thus apparent that during 
the crisis, most of the time, countries benefited from their economic strengths. Oil-rich countries 
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like Algeria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman were able to silent the protests by increasing 
employee’s income, creating new job positions, increasing subsidies and cash payment to 
citizens. This was the crucial point of the remaining of the Persian gulf’s oil-rich kingdoms 238. 
The only exception among the oil-rich countries was Gadhafi’s regime which could not 
use oil revenue for calming down the mounting protests. The overthrow of Gadhafi’s regime 
with oil resources backup, occurred with the NATO air coverage and international interventions 
239. 
Another point worth mentioning is that authoritarian countries which have an economy 
based on tourism should have an interaction with the rest of the world and adopt less strict social 
and cultural rules inside the country. Also, they must provide more facilities for the entrance and 
departure of the tourists and be more flexible. In this situation, it is possible that police strength 
and suppression power decreased and the setting for formation of popular uprising became 
necessary. In this regard, Tunisia and Egypt which were in good terms with other countries 
especially the United States and Israel, could not reach the same level of suppression power 
against the contentious potential as Iraq at the time of Saddam or Libya and Syria. This was one 
of the critical reasons that the Arab Spring had started from Tunisia and Egypt and no other 
states in the region. 
In fact, the level of a country’s dependence to revenues and economic resources outside 
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workers are working near the Persian Gulf and sending tremendous amounts of money back 
home 240. 
Prior to 2011, this issue caused banning of countries which were struggling with 
economic crisis from this privilege, in order to show severity of action against the platforms like 
“Aljazeera” and “Al Arabia” which were supported by Qatar and Saudi Arabia’s administrations.  
At this point, it is not even possible to tolerate foreign interventions while a part of the 
government’s authority in managing the country and preserving the status quo is based on 
foreign revenues. Thus, the government had no other choice to deal with the interferers and even 
sometimes asks for their support. So, it is apparent why Ben Ali ran to the Saudi Arabia and 
during the crisis Mubarak also got an offer to move to the Saudi Arabia with his family.  
Regarding the impact of foreign financial resources, we can point out to the effect of foreign 
loans on the political stability of Ben Ali and Mubarak’s regimes. In 2010, Egypt was the biggest 
foreign assistance receiver for investment in trade division after India and Afghanistan. 
Relatedly, 70% of the mutual assistance and 40% of the whole foreign assistance was related to 
the United States and Germany. Later, Tunisia and Egypt started increasing taxes to pay for their 
debts, which was an extra pressure on society. (UN, 2012) 
According to Smith, (2011) 68.7% of the whole foreign assistance money was related to 
the United States itself. He argues that there was a close relationship between the US military. In 
addition, the US had a great political influence on both Egypt and Tunisia. This could be self-
explanatory that while the US government and president demand change of Mubarak, the process 
of power change has happened much faster. 
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Regarding the Social factors, many of the MENA states were struggled with social 
matters like population growth, the ratio of youth’s number to the whole population, social gap, 
discrimination, and corruption 241. These issues were the most important factors for the public’s 
dissatisfaction with the system. Majority of these countries have ethnic or religious minorities or 
there is a social gap in the society for sectarian reasons.  
Thus, Middle Eastern states which experienced a significant gap between majorities and 
minorities were on more of a favorable ground and got involved with the wave of opposition 
protests earlier 242. In Syria, Saudi Arabia and Libya part of the society that believed were 
victims of discrimination occupied the streets. 
However, the interesting point is that revolutionary movements were successful in those 
states with less heterogeneous and unified populations. Relatedly, the success achievement was 
much faster in states with more unified populations and less religious and ethnic social 
differences. Tunisia which was the first state in the Middle East that witnessed the first victory 
has a more homogeneous population in comparison to Yemen which was the last one 243. 
The fact is, in the Middle Eastern states with a significant gap between minorities and 
majorities, the governments- either from the majorities or minorities have seen more resistance 
and were able to preserve the status quo until now; Although this resistance which is based on 
the government’s dependence on the minorities, seems fragile. 
The social gap has caused by one group assumes their interest is dependent on upholding 
the status quo. Thus, they support the system until the last minute with the help of the military 
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(which recruits most of its members from the same group). This was the case in Syria and 
Bahrain. In contrast, in Tunisia and Egypt, massive protests formed among various social classes 
against the government. In these two countries the social gap was not significant, and no group 
had specific ties or interests in the government, no group considered itself as a loser in the fall of 




7.2.1 The Role of Culture and Social Media 
 
One factor that played a critical role in creation of the domino effect in the Arab Spring 
was culture. Following the protests in Tunisia and inspired by them, opposition in some African 
countries like Djibouti and Uganda, Asian countries like Maldives, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, even China and European countries such as Albania, Croatia and Spain started some 
protests against their governments. None of them were able to be continuous like the Tunisian 
movement. The fact is, the Arab Spring wave which began with the overthrow of Ben Ali only 
occurred in the Middle Eastern countries which was the outcome of the presence or formation of 
a united culture and identity that was facilitating uprisings from on Arabic country to another. 
(Lynch, 2011)245  
After the success of the Tunisian people in ousting their ruler, people in other Middle 
Eastern states assumed they would be able to do so as well. Similar slogans illustrate the impact 
of this shared cultural factor. However, the feeling of a shared identity during the 2011 to 2013 
events was different from the Arabism in the 1960 decade with the leadership of Jamal 
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Abdunnassir. The demand was not changing the political borders of the region and formation of 
a united Arab country; Besides, instead of pointing to foreigners and international powers, it was 
targeting rulers of the Arab’s world itself 246. 
Relatedly, regarding the sub-Arabic cultures, countries with most comparable cultures 
had a significant impact on each other. For instance, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya which were the 
outliers in the protests, were neighbors and shared same north African Arabic sub-culture. 
(Gregg, 2005)247. Regarding the culture, another important factor was the role of technology and 
social media. Television channels like Al -Jazeera248 , social media platforms like Facebook, 
Tweeter, YouTube, and cellphones all played key roles in the occurrence of the Arab 
movements. 
Many scholars argue that, factors such as discrimination, social injustice, political 
autocracy, poverty, and economic inefficiency were always presence in the region. However, the 
new factors which worked as facilitators were technology and social media 249. 
Regarding the impact of the internet and social media as a tool for social movement 
mobilization there are two different arguments. Some scholars like Lerner emphasize the 
negative impacts of the internet on the social movements. They believe that publishing and 
distributing information through the internet would not create enough social capital and social 
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access to the online information that is generated from the non-accurate, non-organized and 
outspread sources, could only cause confusion. Moreover, replacement of the virtual world with 
the real world and face to face interaction could slow down the process of cohesion and 
mobilization which is important for any social movement. 
Although, Lerner believes that the combination of the internet and social media with the 
real-world engagements could create positive impacts. Accordingly, in a closed political system, 
the cyber environment could facilitate blocking out the information and reduce the risk of public 
social interactions 250. 
 Some other scholars and political activists argue that new methods of communication and 
information could create a revolution in the way of civilian’s interaction with their governments. 
A majority of them who belong to the western democratic countries believe that social media 
would enforce authoritarian regimes to be more responsive to their societies. In this regard, first 
cell phones, then weblogs and now social media are the common tools for the oppositions in the 
dictatorship systems.  
 The western analysts even believe that the new media would convert to the new wave of 
democratization 251. Even though they do not pay attention to the limitations and censorship in 
the dictatorship systems.There could be a moderate perspective in between regarding this topic 
which is closer to my own opinion. It is possible to argue that although these new medias will 
not cause the end of dictatorship in the Middle East, they would accelerate the democratic 
transformations. 
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Marc Lynch argues that the new media’s such as cable (specially Algeria TV channel), internet, 
social media have created a new atmosphere in the MENA region that help people to challenge 
the domination of government on the information 252. He continues that in the short-term that the 
new media encourages mobilization by decreasing the expenses of interaction. According to him, 
new informative technologies are so beneficial for the oppositions for spreading the ideas and 
beliefs, creating a mutual language and contentious choices among the protestors 253. 
According to data, during the Arab spring from the beginning of 2011, Facebook as the 
most popular social platform in the Middle East had about 21 million users in the Arabic 
countries and this number reached to 32 million by the end of this year. About 55% of this 
number were between 13 to 24 254. 
Social media played a crucial role by rising the urban protests, encouraging people to 
dealing actively with the events and acting as a platform for people to circulate and analyze the 
related news 255. However, we should not dwell on the importance of social media and we should 
not assume that there was no revolution without social media in the Middle East. This theory is 
flawed for combining tools and the institutional factors of uprisings. The internet was as 
impactful on the occurrence of the mentioned revolutions in the Middle East as were the 
cassettes and flyers in the occurrence of Islamic revolution of Iran. 
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The internet did not generate a new culture and did not create a new reality from “nonentity” but 
paved the path for blossoming of the pre-existing realities 256. Moreover, some of the overthrown 
governments during the crisis just shut down the mentioned social networks. For instance, 
Mubarak’s administration attacked the Aljazeera’s office and by closing it tried to prevent the 
broadcasting. However, the impact of these technological tools in occurrence of the Arab Spring 
is undeniable 257. 
 The power of social media like Facebook and Twitter in social transformation usually get 
underestimated. However, the revolutions and critical changes in the Middle East have changed 
the perception of people towards the social media 258. 
The point is how to use these platforms for creating critical changes. Some argue that without 
Facebook and Twitter there were no Arab uprisings or even not with this pace. They believe the 
way to make a society free is to give them internet 259. 
 According to Philip Howard and Hussain, what triggers the uprisings and protests is not 
only violence of the government or suppressive actions towards people like Bu Azizi or Khalid 
Saeed, but the spread of the news of these events on social media. They continue, what is 
interesting about these uprisings is that almost all of them emerged without a specific leader, 
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charismatic ideologue, labor unions and religious clerics. In Tunisia, Bu Azizi’s self-immolations 
triggered the protests, in Egypt the happenings in Tunisia and the other parts of the region joined 
in after the broadcasting of the uprisings and violations of the government by the Algeria TV 
channel and social media 260. 
 
7.2.2 The Role of Oppositions 
 
In the years prior to the revolution in Egypt and Tunisia, NGO’s, labor unions and 
syndicates were actively involved in mobilizing rebellions and protests 261. 
In Tunisia, “The Al Nahda” party, which once was shut down by Ben Ali, revived itself after the 
regime change and gained 40% votes in the first parliament’s election. In addition, “congress for 
the republic” and “labor and freedom democratic party” which were both active in the previous 
administrations reached some achievements and jointly formed a governmental coalition. 
In Egypt, various groups like “Muslim Brotherhood”, Sufi’s, new Wafd party and some 
other NGO’s and unions by mobilizing the creation of a proper ground for united and organize 
protests and made the power transformation in 2011 much easier and smoother. However, as it 
mentioned earlier, considerable amount of press freedom was present in both these countries 262.  
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In contrast, in Libya, where no trace of civil society was left, reformations became 
violent. Accordingly, after Gadhafi’s overthrow, instability and internal conflicts reached the 
point that split the country into territory of several groups.  
Protests related to the shortage of bread in Egypt plus to the global strike of textile factory’s 
employees in 2008, and other periodical big and small demonstrations all triggered the wave of 
rebellions and dissatisfactions during the years prior to 2011 263. 
relatedly, “Kifaya” or Egyptian movement for change 264 regarding the grievances against the 
status quo and “We are all Khaled Saeed”265 had the most impacts in mobilizing protesters and 




7.3.1 Leader’s Performance at the Time of Crisis 
 
One of the critical determiners in durability or collapse of a regime at the times of political 
crisis would be the authoritarian leaders’ performance. Leadership is in fact, one of the main pillars 
of a successful social movement. 
While the three factors of dissatisfaction, sedimentation of the ideology and the passion for 
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or a proper leadership. The success of a movement is depended on a leadership which can activate 
the dissatisfaction and by using them create the change 267. 
According to Max Weber, there are three types of legitimacy for a leadership: charismatic, 
traditional, and rational 268. Weber believes that most of the successful social movements or 
revolutions have been formed by the charismatic power of a leader. At these times, the relationship 
between people and the leader is based on emotions. Thus, people would accept all the decisions 
even if they are not so reasonable 269. 
Personal characteristics of the leader and his status would create social loyalty and on the other 
hand, could cause popularity which would affect social loyalty. Social loyalty would increase 
liability and accountability of the person and eventually would transform norms and values of the 
supporters. This factor would lead to convergence of the people and production of the social capital 
270. 
Handling street protests and popular demands could play a determinative role. For instance, 
announcing statements like “I have heard your revolutionary message too. I do guarantee an 
administration based on constitution, social justice and national will far from corruption, autarky 
and oppression” or “My actions towards your demands is an irrevocable commitment” during the 
critical moments just contain a message regarding the weakness of the system and possibility of 
extra attacks.  Ben Ali and Mubarak both did the same in their last TV announcement and asked 
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the public to get united to prevent violence and destructive actions. They emphasized their honest 
services of their administration and guaranteed more reforms. In addition, they promised not to 
participate in the next election. What was apparent, however, was the real weakness of the system 
against the uprisings; Giving privileges which they never have done before and shifting their 
positions completely, had a clear message for civil society. 
Relatedly, regarding the role of the leaders, at the times of crisis, both their physical and 
psychological conditions are important. What was clear during the last TV speech of Ben Ali and 
Mubarak was the aging effects and the weak tone in their voices. Specifically, in Egypt, 
publicizing the replacement of Mubarak by his son, had telegraphed the poor physical condition 
of the leader to the society earlier.  
Many scholars argue that crisis sometimes could provide key opportunities for reform. 
However, for systems with fundamental issues and corrupted foundations these opportunities are 
so small and far from the reach. During these situations, it is possible to act quickly instead of 
making announcements and refuse any types of violence or do the exact opposite thing and try to 
suppress the uprisings by help of the police forces and military 271. 
 
7.3.2 The Role of Police Forces and Military 
 
Police and military forces are the main tool of the authoritarian regimes for obliging 
people to obey and upholding their power against the opposition. Collapse of governments define 
whether they remain unsuccessful in using their coercion tool for any reason or if the oppositions 
mobilize a much stronger power against the government. Military and police forces were the 
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most important tool in hands of the Arab dictators for confronting the opposition in recent 
decades. Majority of the Arab leaders had a military background. From 1967 and most of 
Mubarak’s 30 years of leadership, Egypt was running by emergency constitution law. According 
to this law, many leverages were in hand of the police and military forces for suppressing the 
press and restraining parties and communities. For instance, arresting without a warrant was 
legalized in Tunisia. The case was similar in Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, and Yemen; Ghaddafi’s 
Libya was a police state 272. 
During the uprisings known as the Arab spring both police and military forces played a 
crucial role confronting the oppositions or surrendering their demands. In all the involved 
countries, at the beginning the government just used the police forces. Later, by increasing of the 
protesters number and continuation of the uprisings, the military got involved.  
The critical moment during the uprisings was when the military in Tunisia and Egypt refused to 
open fire on the protesters and not only did not support security and police guards but also asked 
them to not act aggressively against the protesters 273 . 
The Egyptian and Tunisian military believed that they were responsible for providing 
security and supporting country against the foreign threats, not an ideology, a specific party, or a 
political system. Such a perception regarding the role of the military in the society, would lead to 
acting based on the constitution at the times of crisis and not supporting the system. Presence of 
the public in the streets with no fear also could prepare the ground for the formation. Yet, it 
should be mentioned that the rate of interest of military in the governmental facilities and 
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financial resources and their perception of the international society’s spot regarding the internal 
transformations could impact their performance.  
In both mentioned cases, the situation had been against the ruling regime 274. This was 
not the case in Libya, or Yemen. Thus, uprisings became lengthy, fierce, and bloody. In both 
Egypt and Tunisia, military forces except the high rank militia officers, not only benefited from 
the economic development but also were realizing that the international community’s perception 
is affiliated with the regime transformation. Regarding the Tunisian and Egyptian alterations, the 
international community did not block the transformations and by calling it the “Arab Spring” 
informed the spring of democracy and freedom to the Arab’s world 275. 
Now the main question is why Arab militaries had different reactions in different states?  
It seems one of the reasons was related to the members which the military was made up of. For 
instance, militaries which majority of the members believe their future and current position 
would be in danger with a change in the system, will lead to more resistance. This case is related 
to those militaries in which recruitment was not merit based but instead was based on the 
connections to the ruling ethnic society (Bahrain), specific group or the leader himself. (for 
instance, Ghaddafi’s military). Respectively, Jordan’s military which consists of tribal members 
of East Jordan’s river remained loyal to the regime in the movement which most of its supporters 
were Palestinians of West Jordan’s river. Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s International guard which 
consists of tribal members of center and West also did not hesitate in supporting the regime. 
In contrast, Egypt and Tunisia which had a more professional recruitment and were not 
concerned about the impact of regime change on their future, remained neutral 276. Syria’s 
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military which was under the command of Alevi’s and Assad’s family and Yemen’s military the 
majority of which was under the direct command of Abdullah Saleh’s close relatives, all 
remained loyal to their regimes.  
The aftermath of Mubarak’s overthrowal proves that Egypt’s military was not interested 
in being involved in the fringe of Egypt’s political developments. This is explainable by the 
position of this military in the society. Egypt’s military for reasons such as being involved in few 
battles with Israel gained a high status in society and during the last decade has been 
participating significantly in the economic activities of the country. (Anderson, 2011) 
In contrast, Tunisia’s military played a more marginal role in the revolution of this country. 
Even despite the declaration of neutrality after the overthrow of Ben Ali, he did not become one 
of the main actors. This could be because Tunisia’s military did not experience any war and did 
not have a specific place in the country.  
 
7.3.3 Foreign Interventions 
 
Foreign intervention is one of the key factors of occurrence of the Arab movements. 
Foreign involvements in the regional politics (U.K till the World War I, and the U.S thereafter) 
which was through the dependent governments, was the main reason of Arab’s deep 
dissatisfaction of the ruling systems 277. There was a linkage between the Arab autocratic 
regimes and the West. These linkages were varied from economic, political, diplomatic ties to 
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cross-border flows of people, services, and information 278. The main concern of these autocrat 
governments was getting the endorsement of the Western powers instead of accountability. The 
point is the linkage to the West contributed to democratization by strengthening oppositions and 
isolating autocrats in the long run. Linkage to the West played a significant role during the Arab 
revolts between 2011 and 2013. While linkage to the external powers prohibited the collapse of 
some regimes or delayed their collapse, facilitated the rapid collapse of others.  
During the uprisings of Tunisia and Egypt, the Western powers after realizing the 
immensity of the revolutionary movements, stopped supporting their previous allies. (Only 
France tried to support Ben Ali against the protesters in Tunisia for a while). Declaring neutrality 
of the West decreased the confidence of the Tunisia and Egypt leaders and eventually led to their 
immediate fall 279. 
Yet, in Yemen, despite the preference of the Western countries and Persian Gulf states to 
Abdullah Saleh’s stay, the massive protesters and oppositions did allow any financial or even 
political intervention in support of Saleh. However, after the Jordan’s chaos, the U.S and Saudi 
Arabia which were the main supporters and longtime allies of Malek Abdullah, sent assistance to 
help the country with their economic and financial difficulties 280.  
 
278 Lotan, Gilad, Erhardt Graeff, Mike Ananny, Devin Gaffney, and Ian Pearce. "The Arab Spring| the revolutions 
were tweeted: Information flows during the 2011 Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions." International journal of 




280 Moon, Younghoon. "Democracy on the horizon: how the Arab Spring is unfolding in Jordan." Harvard 






Saudi Arabia sent financial assistance to the Mubarak’s regime through the Persian Gulf 
Cooperation Council, however, this was not enough for restraining the massive Egyptian protests 
281. 
As for the Yemeni regime, this type of foreign aid reached to its highest point while 
Saudi Arabia started supporting the Al Khalifa regime directly by sending military and troops. 
As it mentioned, foreign intervention in the last two examples, act in support of the involved 
regimes. On the other hand, foreign intervention was the main factor that prevents the dictator of 
an oil-rich country, Gadhafi, for example from accessing financial and military facilities for 
ending the chaos and instability. NATO’s direct intervention was the fastest factor in collapse of 
the Gadhafi’s regime 282. 
As for Syria, the point is, there are so many foreign countries involved in the crisis that 
somehow are supporters of the regime or oppositions. Many of the Arab countries plus Turkey, 
are actively trying to oust Assad while Western countries are on the same side. However, Russia, 
China and Iran are inclined to maintain this regime.  
There is no doubt that the main factor for tracking the events in Syria would be international 
alignments and the way of reforming this alignment.  
It is apparent from the above discussion that years of experience in conditions like 
economic pressure, deep social inequalities, increasing youth unemployment along their 
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dissatisfaction, political suppression, monopolization of power by one family or party and factors 
like this had created the needed setting for formation of grievance-based social movements in 
Tunisia and Egypt.  
The self-immolation of an individual like Bouazizi was enough to trigger the ignored 
demands and feelings of humiliation and to transform them into massive protests.  
The critical question to answer in the next chapter is while all these pressures and barriers exist 








SUGGESTED MODEL FOR EXPLAINING THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE 
MENA REGION 
 
The political crisis in the Middle East is the most complicated regional crisis in the world. 
Domestic factors, regional factors and actors and outsiders all play impactful roles in the process 
of this crisis. This is while recognizing the factors and impactful actors in any crisis, has the 
critical role in examining the crisis and the ways to end it. But now it is time for answering the 
main question of this study. While the crisis was present all over the MENA, and all of the 
MENA countries are struggling with the mentioned challenges, why were Tunisia and Egypt the 
initiators of the Arab Spring and why the outcome of the uprisings were not similar in all of the 
involved countries? What causes the success and failure of each movement? 
the suggested model and the outcomes are based on an analytical-explanatory approach by help 
of case-studies and Brecher research model283.   
 
8.1 Brecher Research Model 
 
Michael Brecher for answering the vague meaning of crisis presents a new definition of 
crisis and studied 323 international crises for this matter. Eventually, he argues that it is possible 
to study a crisis both based on the “actor” and the “system” 284. 
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Brecher model is a combination of the process of crisis, factors, facilitators, and determiners. 
Based on the available variables for this study, ethnic minorities, inflexible political system, 
massive foreign intervention are the critical factors for creating and fueling the MENA region 
crisis.  
Based on the Crisis Theory of Michael Brecher, each crisis would go through four stages. 
Creation: (Brecher, 2013)285: at this stage, the crisis is starting to form. 
Development: (Pick of the crisis): the stage of development of the crisis basically is a stage 
where the crisis would reach to its maximum level which could lead to the maximum mental 
pressure. At this stage, the development factor would be, the transformation of anger from the 
low to higher levels. This could happen by moving from the non-important actions towards the 
significant or sometimes battles among the oppositions. 
Decline: This stage would happen while the opposition groups or other actors realize the 
outcomes of the crisis. From the government’s point of view, the decline of the crisis has been 
recognized by occurrence of the factors like elimination of the threat, time pressure and 
possibility of war. This could create the mindset for the involved actors in the war, that reaching 
an agreement for ending the war and crisis would be the best possible option for both sides.  
Influence: (post-crisis): this stage is about the after math of the crisis and the outcomes that has 
been remained from the involved actors 286. 
However, what is important regarding a crisis is “the reasons, factors and the impactful 
actors in occurrence and development of the crisis”. Michael Brecher by finding a connection 
between the factors of the crisis and its stages, argues that the pre-existing factors and 
 







determiners of a crisis all make the happening of the creation, development, decline and 
influence more possible. This, in fact, is possible by impacting on the understanding of the 
decision makers and public opinion at the same time. According to Brecher, some of these 
factors are the political parties, geopolitical location, political system, and the intervention of the 
regional and international powers 287. 
However, one of the weaknesses of the model is its incapability in finding a proper 
relation between internal and external factors in formation of a crisis and does not create an 
accurate systematic analysis for the crises that still did not reach to their last stage. 
Now, it is time to apply the MENA region on the Brecher crisis model. Based on the stages of 
the model, obviously MENA is at the development stage or pick of the crisis. 
At this stage, some actions will occur from both sides, the powerholders, and the public. 
If we imagine society as a form of hierarchical pyramid, the powerholders are on top of the 
pyramid and the people power or public are at the bottom. Accordingly, the power would flow 
from the top to the bottom, and the power holders are the ones who have the authority for 
controlling the state, social norms, myths, institutions, and laws. Moreover, the outcome is what 
is beneficial for the power holders and unfavorable for the powerless people or the whole society 
288. 
While there is chaos and dissatisfaction in the country, the power holders could use some 
strategies to keep existing problems out of the public’s awareness. It should take into 
consideration that mostly; these strategies are applicable to non-democratic societies. Some of 
these strategies which are being used regularly in MENA are as follows: 
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1- Managing and controlling the accessible information to the public through the media 
2- Denial of the existing problems 
3- Creating fear and distress for the public by displaying a false image of the threatening 
demons (Communism, the West, terrorism) 
4- Creating “societal myths”, which means showing the exact opposite of what is going on in 
the reality 
Now in response, the public at the time of crisis would have different reactions as well.  
In most cases, before any social movement or uprising begins, the public are not aware of the 
violation of their rights and values by the regime. However, they would react differently if they 
knew the truth. 
One possible scenario is related to the time when the regime or the power holders are 
trying to hide their actual doctrines and policies and the reality of what is going on from the 
public. At this time the public who are not aware of what is going on and the violation of their 
interests and just trust the government and support the status quo, by assuming that they cannot 
change the situation and also justifying that power holders are taking care of more important 
causes or issues. Thus, it could be concluded that the public either is not aware of what is going 
on in the country or believes that it is not a severe problem. Yet only 10 to 15 percent of the 
population are conscious and oppose the power holders’ policies. 
The second scenario is related to the time of starting of failure of the institutions. The 
situation is still not that bad. Moreover, power holders are still able to manage the fake news. 
The opposition groups are not still that strong to change the public opinion. Also, the percentage 





The third stage is the stage which is the outcome of the preexisting problems and 
difficulties that build up over many years. At this stage, people are exhausted and unsatisfied. 
They reached the point where none of their expectations have met. It is the best time for the 
opposition to make them aware about the significance of the situation, their violated rights and 
how they became the main victim of the system. The result would be a sharp rise in the number 
of conscious and opposing people. While the power holders would continue to hide the issue by 
controlling the media, social and political institutions and pretend that their policies are 
unchallenged. 
The last stage is when the occurrence of an event or according to Moyer (2001), a 
“trigger event” would lead to take off the social movements. This event is what is a matter for all 
the society. Which the combination of this trigger event with the preexisting unhappiness, anger 
and dissatisfaction would lead to the uprising and protests, no matter of availability or 
mobilization of resources, political opportunity, or the system suppressions. The social 
movements which happen at this stage are categorized as the new social movements. However, 
the success or failure of the movements which would happen at this stage are what is the main 
concern of this study.  
As such, now that we learned about the reasons that made Tunisia and Egypt the initiators 
of the Arab uprisings, by describing the suggested model, and applying it on the two mentioned 
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There are various impactful factors on each of the four main present challenges of 
Secularism-Islamism, economic gap, ethnic and tribal division, and the administrative gap. As 
for the Secularism-Islamism gap the impactful factors are role of Islam and ideology. As we 
mentioned the old and humiliating ideologies have started to fade due to the paradigm shift and 
people now have more tendency towards secular democratic ideas which promote freedom of 
rights and human dignity. The next factor which is technology and social media was so impactful 
in this awareness and distinction of Secularism and Islamism. The last impactful factor in this 
distinction is the ultimate demand of democracy and freedom of rights. People have realized that 
it is not possible to search for this demand in Islamism, since it has no improvement or revision 
since the ancient times. As such, matching the new mindsets, demands and attitudes is not 
possible with the old Islamic ideologies.  
As for the next gap which is the economic gap, the impactful factors are the rentier states, 
dual economy, and the clash between expectations and reality. As it mentioned before, the 
revenue from the rent of the natural resources just circulates among the government instead of 
spreading among the people. This could cause a negative effect for the totalitarian countries that 
instead of having economic growth they would face an economic crisis. The reason is not 
spending the revenue for the development and growth of the country but for practicing 
intervention and control on all the economic and social activities of the society and using 
suppression as needed. corruption is one of the main characteristics of the rentier states, 
However, as the result of education and social media people’s awareness has been increased 
about the system’s massive corruption, increased poverty and social inequality in the society 
despite the economic growth that countries like Tunisia and Egypt had faced prior to the Arab 





they must struggle with basic needs in these rich countries, with revenue from natural resources. 
The dual economy is one of the characteristics of the underdeveloped economy.  
This feature which exists in the Middle East is also another outcome of the rentier states. 
As a matter of this fact there are two sectors present in economy. The modern advanced and the 
traditional one. This division is related to the formation of private organizations which are all 
dependent to the government and work with the rent revenue. The officials of all these 
companies are somehow related to the system. Thus, the revenue of all these organizations just 
circulate among themselves instead of being beneficial to economic growth. This distinction 
would create a dual culture which is related to division of society into two groups of rich and 
poor. It is possible to argue that this distinction between the civilians is the reason behind their 
dissatisfaction and unhappiness and as polls show although prior to the Arab Spring there were 
economic development in Tunisia and Egypt , but the level of relative deprivation and 
dissatisfaction among the youth have been increased between 2009-2010 years and thus, the 
level of their happiness has been decreased Relatedly, during the years prior to the revolution, 
there was no increase in national income in these countries by means of better splits of the 
incomes as a result of increased poverty level due to the massive corruption and social inequality 
in the society 
The next challenge which is ethnic and tribal division was impacted by the minority 
groups which are usually religious minorities or members of a specific tribe or ethnic. They have 
their own demands, and they would cause social challenges in society for sectarian reasons. On 
the other hand, civil society is not strong enough and capable of any maneuver in Middle Eastern 
countries. Although a strong civil society would be able to eliminate the dissatisfactions and 





society. Same as a strong civil society, powerful labor union and NGOs also could have a 
positive impact on ethnic and tribal division. Instead of the presence of various dissatisfied 
minority groups in the Middle Eastern countries, the presence of labor unions and NGOs could 
be helpful in mobilizing people, making them united and eventually creating a proper ground for 
united and organized protests. 
The last challenge is the administrative challenge. This challenge would emerge based on 
the leader’s influence. If the leader only relies on the military for suppressing people by giving 
them privileges, the civil society will increase their distance from the military. Additionally, in 
the Middle East there are still monarchical systems.  The political system of most of these 
regimes are under the influence of monarchies with tribal and religious tendencies and their 
leaders use these tendencies as the logic of politics and government for upholding the status quo. 
These lengthy administrations and monarchies and their policies for ruling all lead to separation 
of the civil society from the military which is the main pillar of the government in the Middle 
Eastern countries. Because according to evidence, mostly, in lengthy administrations, the 
military is and will remain loyal to the system under any conditions. The last impactful factor is 
the foreign aid. People are aware of the wealth and natural resources of their countries, but at the 
same time there are unemployment, poverty, and economic crisis in the country. Yet, the system 
is still dependent on the foreign aid and instead must obey. This leads to dissatisfaction which 
the answer is force and suppression by the military. Thus, we can say foreign aids also would be 








Table 5. The Impactful Factors on the Outcome of the Social Movements 
Possible 
scenarios Foreign intervention 
Military forces 
loyalty  




1a û ü ü Maintain 
1b ü ü ü Maintain 
1c ü ü û Maintain 
2 ü û ü Maintain 
3a û û û Change 
3b û û ü Change 
3c ü û û Change 
4 û ü û Semi-change 
 
 






Based on the existing data when an uprising or social movement happen in a non-
democracy which is at the trigger event stage there are three main determiners which could 
predict the outcome of the success or failure of the movement289. 
Based on the suggested model, there are three impactful determiners at the time of crisis 
in an involved country. Accordingly, presence or absence of any of these factors could lead to 
the main outcomes of change or maintenance of the status quo. Now, I am going to explain each 
scenario with an example and later apply the above model on the three main case studies of this 
research. 
 
8.2 Possible Scenarios 
 
First it should be mentioned that all the mentioned variables for causing the crisis and 
public’s dissatisfaction are present. A majority of people are aware and conscious about the 
situation and they demand change. Oppositions are active. People are trying to take the 
advantage of social media for more awareness despite the censorship. There is the possibility that 
the trigger event has happened.  
Now, I am going to describe the determiners which are all sub-factors under the category 
of administrative challenge. I argue that these factors could create the various outcomes at the 
time of crisis for social movements of MENA. As it mentioned before, foreign intervention could 
play an important role at the time of crisis. Also, it was one of the main factors that led to 
occurrence of the Arab Spring. The linkages between the Arab countries and the West always 
exist. Put differently, the Arab autocrat leaders were always somehow dependent on the West 
and needed their endorsement instead of accountability. However, while there is a possibility that 
 





linkage to the West prevents the collapse of a country at the time of crisis, the opposite is also 
possible. It all depends on the benefit and advantage the change or maintenance that the country 
which is struggling could have for the foreign countries. Accordingly, despite the linkage to the 
West, in some of the below scenarios there is no sign of foreign intervention at the time of crisis.  
The next factor in this scenario is the relationship between the military and police forces 
and the public.  In some of the MENA countries, the regime is being ruled by the previous 
military officer who has become a civilian politician over time. In this type of regime, the 
military has the veto right and occasionally acts through the unofficial channels behind the 
scenes. Egypt, Algeria, and Syria are examples. 
Monarchies which are reliant on the tribes, as mentioned before, are more in oil-rich 
countries around the Persian Gulf, Morocco, and Jordan. In these systems, maintenance of the 
status quo depends on the previous recruitment from the tribes or the linkage to the foreign 
countries. As for Bahrain, Oman and Qatar, the dependence on the foreign countries is 
impressive. Bigger monarchies like the Saudi Arabia and Morocco use the loyal tribal forces for 
balancing and controlling the military. In regimes with dual militaries, military forces are acting 
based on an ideology instead of tribal loyalties. Examples are Iraq during Saddam Hussein and 
Libya during Qaddafi’s administration 290. 
While according to the evidence, throughout history, many of the Arab leaders had the 
support and loyalty of the military, there are some exceptions. In general, we can argue that 
during each of the Arab uprising and movements, the military played a critical role.  
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The last impactful factor is the leadership. The performance of the leader at the time of crisis 
could easily change the path of the scenario. Playing an honest role at this time and listening to 
the people’s demands by creating some immediate changes could be helpful. Age and the health 
condition of the leader, weak or strong tones, expectation levels of the public demands all could 
affect the outcomes. 
 
8.2.1 Scenario 1a 
In this defined scenario, according to the records and outcomes of the Arab Spring when 
there is no linkage to the West or Western countries do not see any benefits in intervention, the 
military is loyal to the system and is against the public by using force and violence, and the 
leader displays the best of himself in managing the crisis, the outcome is equal to maintaining of 
the status quo.  
Example: Algeria  
The wave of Arab uprisings did not affect Algeria in the way it had its eastern neighbors. 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika was able to control the uprisings and disputes in 2011. He perfectly took 
advantage of the people’s fear of getting back to the bloody old domestic wars of the 90s by 
announcing a set of reforms and at the same time establishing his authority. Moreover, he was 
chosen for the fourth time as the president in 2014. After controlling two different waves of 
uprisings on January and February in 2011, he guaranteed political reforms which would be able 
to deepen the democratic process and also give the chance to citizens to prioritize the choices that 
are related to their future much easier 291. 
 






The truth is, in contrast to Tunisia and Egypt, the main power in Algeria is in the military’s 
hands. The capability of the police forces and the gendarmerie were reinforced dramatically since 
the civil conflict in 1990s and the number of police forces were about 200,000 by the end of 2000s.  
Moreover, the president cannot act against the generals. The problem is that military’s influence 
is not limited to the government, but it is dominant on country’s economy too. However, during 
the 2011 uprisings the police force did not act brutally, but their presence was enough for the riots 
to spread without acting aggressively.   
Because of the active presence of military and police forces in Algeria’s uprisings during 
the Arab Spring, the disputes were not fruitful the same as Egypt and Tunisia.  
Finally, at the time of crisis there was no sign of foreign intervention or financial support in 
Algeria. Thus, the outcome was maintaining of the status quo by Bouteflika’s leadership with some 
practical reformations as people demand 292. 
 
8.2.2 Scenario 1b 
In this scenario all the studied factors are present. There is a linkage between the involved 
country and the West. So, the possibility of the foreign intervention is available. The Military is 
loyal to the regime and is against the public by operating based on the situation. Leader is also 
acting properly in handling the crisis. The outcome of this situation is maintaining the status quo.  
Example: Bahrain 
Bahrain is among the countries which faced the crisis. The uprisings in this country 
began on Feb 14th, 2011. Most of the population are Shia and the minority are Sunni. The 70% 
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Shia population of this country has no presence in any of the monarchy organization, any 
managerial positions, or macro businesses. When people decided to demonstrate to demand their 
rights, they faced with a massive suppression by the military guards.  
In Bahrain, mercenary forces are being used for controlling the military. Since the Sunni 
regime of Bahrain believes it is vulnerable against the Shia, they found no other way other than 
using foreigners (specially Pakistanis) for forming a powerful and suppressor military against the 
Shia opposers 293. The Al Khalifa regime distributed the critical and military positions among the 
group of loyal officers to the royal family. Thus, the military stands by the regime and shut down 
the riots.  
Other than suppressing the protestors in the streets by Bahrain’s government forces, 
Saudi forces were also present there. Saudi Arabia sent military forces to Bahrain for shutting 
down the uprisings, by following three main goals: First, maintaining the stability of the region 
and preventing the entrance of chaos and disorder into Saudi Arabia; Second, to be able to play a 
more active role in the region by keeping the connection with the West; and third, preventing the 
possible influence of Iran on the majority of Bahraini Shias 294. 
Military intervention of the Saudi Arabia in Bahrain is one of the important reasons that 
has prevented the occurrence of a revolution in Bahrain. On March 14, 2011, 2000 soldiers 
containing 1200 Saudi soldiers which were supporting by tanks, and 800 Emirati soldiers, 
entered Bahrain by official invitation of Al Khalifa’s administration 295. 
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In Bahrain, the full support of the regime by military and security forces, prevented the 
demonstrators to achieve both the structural reformations and political-structural alterations. As 
such, violent repression of the opposers by the Al Khalifa and Al Saud’s military forces, caused 
continuity of frozen politics.  
By reviewing scenario 1a and 1b we can conclude that when the variables of leaders’ 
performance and military loyalty to the system are present, the presence or absence of foreign 
intervention does not result in the system change. 
 
8.2.3 Scenario 1c 
 
During this scenario there is a connection between the country involved in the crisis and 
foreign countries. Thus, there is the possibility of foreign intervention as needed. Moreover, the 
military and police force are against the public and loyal to the regime. On top of that, the 
performance of the leader is not satisfactory. As such, the outcome of this scenario would be the 
continuance of the status quo. 
Example: Yemen 
Yemen also got involved with new transitions by the beginning of the MENA’s uprisings. 
People of this country challenged the Abdullah Saleh administration by emerging a people’s 
movement 296. 
Majority of the social forces that stand against the Saleh’s regime in 2011 are as follows: 
the students and youths’ movement, Houthis, Southern people, Al Ahmar impactful family and 
groups of the military officers which got separated from the Saleh’s regime. Thus, in Yemen, 
that part of the military which had tribal dependence got separated from Saleh and that caused 
 






armed conflicts. The full control and authority of the military was in the hands of Saleh’s 
children and relatives for their guaranteed loyalty.  
During the uprisings, at the beginning Saudi Arabia started to support Saleh and 
demanded he maintain of power. Later, by expansion of the protests and the possibility of its 
entrance to Saudi Arabia, Saudis planned for ousting Saleh peacefully 297. 
With the decision of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, and the U.S support, Mansur 
Hadi was replaced with Saleh. However, this did not lead to the end of difference among the 
various movements. The incapability of Hadi’s administration in splitting the power among the 
oppositions, impacted the Yemen Shia’s dissatisfactions. The coincidence of this happening with 
reinforcement of the Al-Qaida’s forces in south Yemen, led to more chaos and instability in 
Yemen. Continues protest of Ansarullah298 forces against the regime corruption, dependence of 
the regime to the West and the United States, economic policies of the government, all caused 
the progress of the Shia’s forces to the point that the government and oppositions signed a peace 
and partnership agreement. According to this agreement, the president was responsible for 
creating the essential foundation for forming the government of national unity by Houthi’s 
participation. However, after a while, oppositions began their contentious by calling the 
government’s action fake and insufficient. The protests became more serious in 2014 and 
eventually led to taking control of Yemen’s capital, Sanaa and surrounding of the presidential 
house. The power and influence of the Houthi’s made the northern neighbors worry. Thus, Saudi 
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Arabia began their air invasion in March 2015 against the Ansarullah by supporting Hadi’s 
regime. (Nejat et al., 2016)299 
Thus, replacing Saleh with Hadi not only helped the crisis in Yemen but also amplified it. 
As such, by the contentiousness of the Houthis to Hadi and reaching the domain of the protests to 
the capital, he had no other way than leaving the country and escaping to Saudi Arabia. (Hasan, 
2011)300 
To conclude, through these transformations, Hadi’s administration was able to infiltrate 
to some areas and establish a government in Odon 301. In general, the role of the military in the 
process of uprisings was against the people and it saved its loyalty to the regime somehow.  
By comparing scenario 1b and 1c we can conclude that, when the factors of foreign 
intervention and military loyalty to the system are present, the leader’s performance does not 
matter, and the outcome would be maintaining of the status quo. 
 
8.2.4 Scenario 2 
In the third scenario, the linkage between the involved country and the West exists. So, 
there is the possibility of the foreign intervention if they believe it is necessary. The performance 
of the leader is acceptable during the crisis. However, military and police forces instead of 
remaining loyal to the regime, stand next to the public. This factor by itself is enough for 
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Right after the beginning of the uprisings in Tunisia, Jordanian people started protesting 
by gathering in the Amman’s streets, demanding political change. However, the uprisings in 
Jordan were not comparable to the mass protests in Tunisia or Egypt. 
In the case of Jordan, the demand for uprisings was mainly a change of government and not a 
revolution. Thus, the king sacrificed governments such as Marouf al-Bakhit 302and Samir al- 
Rifai303 one after the other and by throwing early parliament elections and revising the 
constitution, starting a direct interaction with the political parties, prevented any contentious 
towards the head of power and the kingdom. Later, he just limited the dissatisfaction to the 
government and eventually stopped it 304. 
The essence of uprisings in Jordan was not aggressive from the beginning. This was 
dependent on a couple of reasons. First, the government was so cautious in using force against 
the protesters. At the same time, protesters were hopeful to be able to get along with the king for 
creating some crucial changes. They believed that violence only would hurt their position for 
negotiation and would ruin any possible opportunity for reformation 305. 
 
302 Marouf Suleiman al-Bakhit ( born 1947) was a Jordanian politician and two-time Prime Minister. He first served 
as Prime Minister from 27 November 2005 until 25 November 2007 and then again from 9 February 2011 to 17 
October 2011 
 
303 Samir Zaid al-Rifai  (born 1 July 1966) is a Jordanian politician who was prime minister of Jordan from 14 
December 2009 to 9 February 2011. 
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According to the reports of the Center for Strategic Studies of Jordan University (CSS), 
80% of people were against the street protests and 55% of them believed that the protests would 
lead to chaos and could weaken of the stability and security 306. 
The Jordanian officials followed the carrot and stick strategy through the uprisings. By giving 
the protesters enough freedom to express their anger and dissatisfaction, at the same time they 
tried to control the protesters by using of force for creating specific red lines, especially 
regarding the criticism of monarchy 307. 
Regarding the foreign policy of Jordan and the foreign intervention during the chaos it 
should be mentioned that Jordan is the second Arabic-Islamic country that recognizes Israel, and 
two countries share a land border. Interaction of this country with the U.S representatives proves 
their intention in controlling the situation in Jordan. Moreover, the Second Abdullah, asked the 
international figures and leaders of neighboring countries for helping him out of the chaos. By 
following their suggestions along the Western analysts’ tips, he decided to make some calm 
reforms after controlling the public anger and dissatisfaction. In this way, he believed he could 
prevent the weakening of his administration pillars and at the same time provide the benefits of 
his Western supporters 308. 
Another thing that helped the Jordanian officials to confront the protests was the financial 
aid of the other countries. For instance, Saudi Arabia, gave 400 million dollars in financial aid to 
 
306 Abu Rumman,(2011).(Arabic)ah-Khwanal-Muslimunmabad Muqat a Intikhabat.(Amman Center for Strategic 
Studies.University of Jordan).  
 
307 Samuel, and Tally Helfont. "Jordan: Between the Arab spring and the gulf cooperation council." Orbis 56, no. 1 
(2012): 82-95. 
 







Jordan in 2011. The Gulf Cooperation Council guaranteed to help Jordan more than 2 billion 
dollars in the next five years and asked Jordan to join this council 309. 
The United States also other than military assistance gave about 682,700-million-dollar financial 
aid. 
To conclude, the United states and Saudi Arabia despite the different orientation against 
the Jordan, do not attempt to lose a stable and valuable ally in the MENA region. (Bassam et al., 
2004)310 
 
8.2.5 Scenario 3a 
This scenario is completely the opposite of the previous one. There is no foreign 
intervention at the time of crisis. the linkage between the involved country and the West might 
exist or not. At the same time, Military is beside the public instead of being loyal to the system. 
Moreover, the leader’s performance is not acceptable. There are signs of weakness and accepting 
failure. Thus, the outcome would be a change of the status quo.  
Example: Tunisia 
As I mentioned earlier, the revolutions and uprisings of the Arab world, began with the 
Tunisia’s protests. When a youth, Muhammed Bouazizi in a small city, Sidi Bouzid, burned 
himself in public, in objection to confiscation of all his belongings and only source of income, it 
was a spark which set the dictatorship of Bin Ali on fire. From that day, protests began from this 
small suburb, and reached to other cities and the capital. The reaction of the government to the 
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wave of protests, emerged in two ways.  Bin Ali’s administration at the beginning used security 
forces for repressing the protestors as always. Although the protests not only did not stop, they 
got expanded with increased strength. Eventually, Bin Ali, asked the military to come to the 
streets for protecting the federal organizations and institutions or in fact helping in suppressing 
people. This action had a great impact on the success of the revolution. The reason was that the 
military not only suppressed people but also on many occasions played like a guard between the 
protestors and security guards and prevented the suppression of the citizens by them. When Bin 
Ali realized that he was not successful in managing the chaos, he insisted on meeting the military 
commander. He asked the commander to either suppress the protests or resign which he refused. 
Later, General Rashid Ammar, the commander of Tunisia’s military joined the revolutionaries 
and asked Bin Ali to withdraw 311. 
At this point, thousands of police forces joined the protesters in the uprisings against the 
regime to show their sympathy. (Daily Mail, January 24th, 2011) 
It was the exact next day that general Rashid Ammar officially announced that he joined the 
revolutionaries and will support the revolution. (Al-Jazeera, 2011) 
For some reasons, the Tunisian military was not interested in defending Bin Ali’s power. 
Moreover, family corruption of the regime disappointed the military. Bin Ali played down the 
military to prevent the military’s intervention in political issues. The Tunisian military became 
weak and it was less than 30,000 forces. This little number was the reason that the military was 
weaker than other organizations and instead of being impactful was more under control. This 
was one main reason that the military was not behind Bin Ali. In general, the military was not 
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involved in the domestic issues. Thus, remainder of Bin Ali at power was equal to remainder of 
the military in the shadows. As such, the military by supporting the revolutionaries was hopeful 
to achieve a better position at the new administration 312. 
Put differently, the military sacrificed Bin Ali, for controlling the chaos and preventing 
the complete collapse of the regime. Moreover, since the military was doubtful about the 
possible substitutes after the collapse of the regime, it got involved and called itself a supporter 
of the revolution to prevent the radical’s surfing by two strategies. First, the military gained 
much credit and popularity by standing beside the protesters and secondly, stood beside the 
public and supported the revolution by sacrificing Bin Ali. 
 
8.2.6 Scenario 3b 
 
During this scenario, the leader’s performance is acceptable. However, the leader alone 
will not be able to handle the crisis without having any support. Since there is no foreign 
intervention and the military is not loyal to the leader, no matter the power of the leader, the 
outcome would be change of the status.  
Example: N/A 
By reviewing the scenarios 3a and 3b we can conclude that when the variables of foreign 
intervention and military loyalty to the system are absent, the leader’s performance does not 
matter, and the outcome would be change of the status. 
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8.2.7 Scenario 3c 
 
In the scenario 3c, there is a linkage to the West or in other words the foreign countries 
see the outgoing situation beneficial for intervention. It could be because of the natural resources 
or the sensitive geopolitical position of the involved country. However, the military and police 
forces stay beside the people by supporting them instead of suppressing them or foreign 
countries would not let the military to support the leader. Accordingly, the leader appears so 
weak and scared through the speeches, and the military is not loyal to the system, thus there is no 
other way than withdrawing and leaving the country. The outcome of this scenario would be a 
change of the status quo.  
With that being said, by comparing scenario 3a and 3c, we can conclude that when the 
leaders performance is not acceptable, and the military is not loyal to the leader, no matter of 
presence or absence of foreign intervention, the outcome would be change of the status quo. 
Example: Islamic Revolution of Iran 1979 
Iran during the Reza Shah dynasty was dependent to the West. At the time of uprisings, 
there was foreign intervention against the Shah. Also, according to the recent reports, the United 
States which was involved in the regime change did not let the military to support the Shah. 
Military stayed besides the people. Shah who was sick and weak, left the country. By presence of 
foreign intervention, weak leadership, and disloyalty of the military to the regime, the outcome 







8.2.8 Scenario 4 
In this case, there is no foreign intervention. The military and police forces are still loyal 
to the system and doing their jobs. However, the performance of the leader is weak. It is possible 
that he leaves the country prior to the uprisings. At this time, based on the military’s strength in 
handling the situation, it is possible for them to take control and suppress the uprisings. But it is 
also possible that they try to settle down the public by listening to their demands and take the 
control of the administration until transferring it to the next leader. So, we can argue that the 
outcome in this scenario would be semi-change. Because even if the military takes the control, 
the status quo will not remain the same. The outcome would be reaching the demands partially 
and not completely. So, I defined the outcome of this scenario is semi-change. 
Example: Egypt 
Hosni Mubarak after 30 years of leadership, through the 18 days of political protests and 
riots, withdrew from power on Feb 11th, 2011 and handed over the power to the armed forces.  
Egypt’s military which was one of the biggest militaries in the Middle East and had a specific 
status because of its achievements in the battle with Israel and the great security performance in 
defending the boarders and the Suez Canal313 314. 
The Egyptian military had a close relationship with the society. Military was able to fully 
control the lack of security in the streets during the beginning of the riots. However, when the 
anti-riot forces opened fire on the protesters at the Tahrir square of Cairo, they stayed neutral. 
 
313 The Suez Canal is a man-made waterway connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean 
via the Red Sea. It enables a more direct route for shipping between Europe and Asia, effectively 
allowing for passage from the North Atlantic to the Indian Ocean without having to circumnavigate 
the African continent.  
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Moreover, eventually the military decided to withdraw from Mubarak’s regime and maintain the 
system. With the fall of Hosni Mubarak and formation of the military transfer council, they 
followed three goals. Guaranteeing remaining of the positive image of the military in the society, 
protecting the country from the regional and international wars, and creating economic 
conditions. As such, during the transformation, the military tried to keep the crowd out of the 
streets to following its goals by creating peace and stability in the country 315. 
After officially announcing its neutrality, the Egyptian military tried to protect the public 
and historical places. Moreover, they announced clearly that they are not going to shoot the 
protesters. The defense minister also declared that the military would respect civilian’s demands, 
is aware of its responsibility in protecting the revolutionary act of the nation and will support the 
freedom of speech and the peaceful negotiation of any of the citizens 316. 
Mubarak’s performance was not acceptable during the crisis and the military was able to easily 
convince him to withdraw. The military took the power which lasted until the transferring of the 
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CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS, AND THE FUTURE STUDIES 
As we mentioned earlier, the timeline between 2010 and 2014 was an important timeline 
in the history of the MENA region. Many uprisings and social movements happened in different 
Middle Eastern countries demanding transformation of the political system. Although, some of 
the movements failed and some were successful in reaching their political demands or creating 
change in the political system. But the important point is that the social situation of the involved 
countries in the Arab Spring have been changed since the occurrence of these movements.  
One reason could be related to the occurrence of these uprisings after a long period of time. 
Since the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, there has been no noteworthy if any massive 
protest or uprising in the MENA region.  
Although there was pre-existing dissatisfaction among the people, there was not a proper 
political space to express the dissatisfaction and amid the fear and closed political system, even 
visualization of any dramatic political and social transformation was far-reaching for the people.  
Moreover, what is clear is that the nature of these uprisings and movements was make them 
different with the 20th century movements like Marxism, nationalism, or movements with 
religious roots 317. 
Later, this study tries to answer two main questions. Other than answering why and how 
these movements emerged in the MENA region, the important question which is among all the 








Moreover, the goal of this study was examining the factors which would help a movement to be 
successful in the MENA region. Although, it should be mentioned that what we measured in this 
study is not a 100% success or failure.  
What we realized through this study is that there is a large amount of literature related to 
the questions about “how” and “why” social movements emerge in the first place. However, the 
problem was that many of the studies were related to the political outcomes of the social 
movements. What makes it problematic was the difficulty in examining whether the political 
outcome was the result of specific social movements or other factors within a particular time 
frame or context have been involved too. On top of that, would the political outcome in one state 
with a specific political system be like the political outcome in another state with a closed 
political system? 
There were various definitions for the social movement in the literature. Some scholars 
define social movements as the actions that groups or people of a society who are involved in a 
social or political conflict take by expressing their critical oppositions, in order to reverse the 
direction of conflict with what it is or what is in contrast with the historical process. (Touraine, 
1981).318 
 In order to answer the above questions and as for my own contributions, this research 
started by reviewing the main theories of social movements, both the traditional theories such as 
the resource mobilization theory (RMT), the political process theory (PPT), the collective 
behavior theory and the framing theory along with the new social movement theory. By 
comparing these two different categories, I learned that while the main goal of the classic social 
movements is expressing their demands by getting along with the status quo, the new social 
 






movements attempt is challenging the status quo. Additionally, the main struggle of the classic 
movements is associated with the class conflicts regarding the allocation and production while 
the new social movements have critical issues with the norms and values. Participation and 
membership in the new social movements is more relaxed and informal in contrast to the classic 
ones. While the classic ones are more static, intensive, and hierarchical, the new ones are more 
flexible, unofficial, and participatory. Finally, the main strategy of the classic social movements 
is reaching the desired demands by cooperating with the government while the new social 
movements try to impact the public mind by making them follow non-political strategies.  
Later, we reviewed the characteristics of a conductive political environment with the 
essential resources and required preconditions for the occurrence of the social movements which 
are participants, SMOs, established the structure of solidary incentive, networks and leaders.  
Eventually, by applying the mainstream theories of social movements (RMT, PPT and 
NSMs) to the case of MENA this research realizes that all these theories emerged in democratic 
countries with constitutionally open political environments and advanced western societies. 
 The resource mobilization theory is well-known as one of the mainstream social 
movement theories which is an attempt to study the collective actions in western societies. 
Moreover, this theory tries to examine the reaction of the actors in the presence of political 
opportunities. Although the outcome and the level of change the opposition groups would be 
able to create is related to the resources available to them besides the ways that they employed 
those resources. What is clear is that the requirements and preconditions which are needed for an 
explainable social movement with this theory are not available in the closed political system of 
the Middle Eastern countries. Even if opposition groups would be able to create proper 





social and political adjustments. Thus, the characteristics of the recent social movements in the 
MENA region are somehow unique and we could describe them as more short-lived contentions 
with no ideology, structure, and official leadership. 
As for the political process theory in contrast to the resource mobilization theory, the 
focus is more on the political opportunities instead of the available or essential resources. 
According to the PPT theorists’ political opportunities are preexisting and the actors should only 
wait for the right time to follow them. However, this is not the case in the closed political 
systems. These types of opportunities are rarely available in non-democratic countries and if they 
are, the government blocks the way to reach them to prevent any challenge towards the status 
quo. Additionally, the penalty to those opposition groups or individuals who pass the narrow 
limits would be detention, long term jails, prohibition of work or even execution. The 
contemporary movements which happened in MENA all emerged as momentary movements, 
with no specific ideology, organization, or proper leadership. All these characteristics are in 
sharp contrast with the movements in the west that occur through the available political 
opportunity with specific demand and leadership. 
The application of the new social movement theory which generated in the west as the 
development of a specific phase of western liberal societies, on MENA is highly challenging. 
This theory along with its different models are mostly related to the issues and demands of the 
advanced, capitalist, postindustrial societies. Middle Eastern societies where still struggling for 
democracy are far away from these types of societies with a stable democracy. To conclude, the 
foundation of the theories of social movements is based on the experiences and happenings in the 





theory for explaining the occurrence of the social movements in MENA, their nature and the 
reason behind the failure or success of the movements. 
This research contributes to the social movements’ literature first by explaining the nature 
of social movement of MENA and also by explaining the historical context of the MENA region 
it examines the obstacles to democracy which is the main reason that makes the nature of Middle 
Eastern movements different from the rest of the world.  
As we realized during the previous chapters, both classic and new social movement 
theories fall short for explaining the contemporary social movements in MENA. based on the 
findings/ first contribution of this research there are multiple reasons involved for incapability of 
these theories and the need for a reconsideration. 
First, the nature of the nature of the contemporary social movements in the MENA region 
has been totally revised. However, there are little theoretical contributions, to my knowledge, 
related to the social movements in non-democratic and non-western countries.  And even the 
assumptions of the little available literature have never been revised. 
The fact is the nature of the contemporary social movements in the MENA is far from the 
nature of the previous social movements in this region which the most important one was the 
Islamic revolution of Iran. However, the context and pattern of the region itself is still the same 
and far from Utopian and democratization. Put differently, there is a duality between the system 
and its ideologies and the citizen’s requests and demands.  
According to the findings of this research, the reasons behind the transformation of the 
nature of the social movements in MENA are respectively, demographic change, education, 
political awareness of people, creation of a new sociological context as a matter of education and 





All these mentioned factors confirm the necessity of the theoretical revision related to the 
Middle Eastern social movements and moving beyond the general narratives and historical 
models for studying movements in the politically closed systems or non-democracies.  
The second contribution of this study is explaining the features that make the context and 
nature of the Middle East itself unique and different. As it mentioned before, the presence of 
democracy is the necessary precondition for formation of social movements. However, all these 
temporary social movements occurred in the Middle East while democracy is not present there. 
This research examines the obstacle to democracy in this region that due to their presence they 
are not capable of completely blocking the emergence of social movements in this region. The 
social movements might occur despite the obstacles; however, they might not be fruitful for a 
couple of reasons, which this research will elaborate later as another contribution. 
The MENA region is far from utopia and democratization for factors such as the 
traditional structure, the weakness of the civil society and culture, lack of political, social and 
economic development, the compatibility or incompatibility between religion and democracy, 
structure of nondemocratic Middle Eastern systems and rentier states. 
What is clear is the demand for democracy, freedom, social and economic development 
in the Middle East is increasing. Moreover, due to modernization and globalization controlling 
the public awareness is not that easy for authoritarian regimes. Although they are under lots of 
pressure for preventing any chaos, at the same time they try to uphold the status quo in any 
possible way. 
In order to have a broader idea about the best possible way to explain the contemporary 





of their failure or success this research does a meta-analysis of most of the available previous 
studies. 
Moreover, by taking a theoretical position towards the previous studies, this research tries 
to not only gather all the previously studied variables related to the Middle East but also add 
more variables along a comprehensive model in order to unfold the required perquisites for the 
emergence of a fruitful social movement in the MENA region. 
The mentioned variables in the previous studies were divided into two categories of 
institutional factors and facilitators. After reviewing all the studied variables along with the 4 
major present challenges in the Middle East which are secularism-Islamism, economic gap, tribal 
and ethnic division and the gap between the administrative gap, I defined 3 categories of 
variables. Institutional factors which contain clash between the expectation and reality, public’s 
distrust in government, sedimentation of the present ideology and social, political, and economic 
instability. The second group is made up of facilitators that contain the role of labor unions and 
NGOs and the role of culture and social media. The last group is of determiners that are the 
leader’s performance at the time of crisis, police forces and military position and the foreign 
intervention. Later, by combining the four major present challenges in the Middle East, the 
related variables that are the outcomes of each gap and by help of three different cases of 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain, I defined a chart. 
According to this chart, the secularism-Islamism gap would be impacted by the role of 
Islam and ideology, internet and social media and democracy/freedom of belief and thought. The 
next gap which is the economic gap would be impacted by the gap which exists between 
expectations and reality in society, the dual economy, and the feature of the rentier state. The 





society and the presence of labor unions or opposition groups. Finally, the administrative gap 
would be impacted by the leader’s performance specially at the time of crisis, the position of 
military and the foreign intervention. 
By studying the correlation between all these variables through the Brecher crisis model, 
I realized that not all the Middle Eastern countries are at the same stage of crisis. As such, that is 
why one country was the initiator of the uprisings or the uprisings outcomes were different in the 
various countries which were involved in the Arab uprisings.  
As for the findings of my study, I learned that there are three main determiners which are 
able to predict the outcome of a movement in the Middle East; Foreign intervention, military and 
police force against the civil society, head of the system’s performance at the time of crisis. Yet, 
two other preconditions are required; The country should be a non-democratic country and it 
should be at the trigger event stage. Based on these three determiners I defined my model for 
prediction of the outcome of social movements in the MENA region. 
According to my model, as I mentioned the most impactful determiners for the success or 
failure of movements in the Middle East region are leader’s performance at the time of crisis, the 
military and police forces position (beside the civilians or against them) and the foreign 
intervention. Based on this model, there are 8 possible scenarios. In the scenario 1a the foreign 
intervention is absent; the military is loyal to the regime and is against the people and the 
performance of the leader is powerful and proper. Thus, the outcome would be the remaining 
status quo and the example is Algeria. 
The scenario 1b is a scenario in which all the three variables are available. There is 
foreign intervention in support of the system, the military is loyal to the system and the 





success of the system in upholding the status quo and failure of the social movement. The 
example for this scenario is Bahrain. 
The scenario 1c is a scenario in which the foreign intervention exists, the military is loyal 
to the regime, the leader’s performance is not powerful. The outcome would be remaining of the 
status quo. The example of this scenario is Yemen.  
In the scenario 2, foreign intervention is present in support of the system, the military and 
police forces are beside the civilians. However, the performance of the leader of the country is 
powerful and proper in handling the crisis. Therefore, the outcome would be remaining of the 
status quo and failure of the social movement. The example for this scenario is Jordan.  
In the scenario 3a, all the variables are absent. There is no foreign intervention, the 
military is not loyal to the regime and the performance of the leader in handling the chaos is not 
proper. Thus, the outcome would be the success of the social movement. Tunisia is the example 
for this scenario.  
In the scenario 3b, there is no foreign intervention, the military is beside the people and 
the performance of the country’s leader is proper. The outcome though is change of the status 
quo and success of the social movement. There is no example available for this scenario. 
In the scenario 3c, there is foreign intervention against the regime, the military stands 
beside the people instead of suppressing them and the performance of the head of the system is 
weak and not acceptable at the time of crisis. As such, the outcome would be change of the status 
quo and success of the social movement. Example would be Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979.  
 The outcome of the scenario 4 is a little bit different. There is no foreign intervention, the 
military is against the people and loyal to the regime. However, the leader is not successful 





side. There is a possibility that the military will take control of the country for a while and later 
either respond to civilian’s demands positively or negatively. Therefore, I defined the outcome of 
this scenario semi-change. The example for this case is Egypt. 
To conclude, I defined this model based on the available cases and evidence in the 
MENA region during the contemporary uprisings. I believe that the three mentioned variables 
are critical in determining the outcome of social movements in this region. although, I should 
emphasize on this point again that the defined success or failure is not 100% and could be 
different in each scenario since the demand of each movement is different. While in one social 
movement the demand is regime change, in another case it could be just economic and social 
stability or other demands.  
 
9.1 Limitations 
To complete this study, I faced some limitations that should be mentioned. In general, 
studying politics of the Middle East is not an easy task. From my own experience, I realized 
there are some major drawbacks to study politics of the Middle East.  
The first and main limitation for studying the Middle East is that literature related to the 
politics of the Middle East is not rich. Due to the lack of transparency, accessing accurate and 
essential data is not easy. Moreover, regarding the contemporary social movements in the 
MENA region and the Arab uprisings, which are all recent happenings or somehow on going, the 
field is properly new and mostly does not agree on the importance of some factors. Thus, for 
solving this problem, the best alternative is using international databases, since the domestic data 





The second problem is the dichotomy of the perspective and ideas between the Middle 
Eastern scholars who live inside the Middle East and the Middle Eastern scholars who are 
outside the Middle East and as such have more freedom in writing their ideas and opinions. The 
process of which literature to choose and what pieces are more applicable to this study was so 
hard for these reasons. To overcome this problem and in order to have a more accurate and 
broader idea about my research, I tried to study a handful of literature which contains various 
categories of scholars; American, European, Middle Eastern inside and outside the Middle East 
along with the non-English resources. However, since all the mainstream theories of social 
movements deal with Western circumstances and are based on the west-centric point of view, it 
was crucial to be careful if the theory could be adopted to the conditions presented by each state 
in this research. 
Moreover, the fact is, it is not easy to write about the Middle East and not be a Middle 
Eastern or be an outsider who never lives there. Another major point is even various cases in the 
Middle East are not similar and it is not possible to generalize the theories and apply them to all 
the different cases in the MENA region. what I realized during my research is that each of these 
cases and countries carry a different and unique historical or contextual root of concepts. Also, 
there are lots of local meanings and happenings that without knowing them the comparison of 
cases might pose a challenge for comparison.  
The other limitation which I faced and is common and well-known in the field of social 
science regarding the Middle East is exceptionalism. Because studying the Middle East is not an 
easy job for the scholars, both for traveling there or accessing the data and resources related to 
the politics of the Middle East, this region is known as an exception which due to its uniqueness 





issue would lead to another problem which is the disposition of the Middle Eastern scholars 
against the theory. According to them studying Middle East is more explanatory and empiricist. 
Although, in this research I tried to transform these limitations to opportunity, to contribute to 
the literature as a person who is Middle Eastern and lived there for three decades.  
 
9.2 Future Studies 
By revisiting the previous related studies and studying the patterns of contemporary 
social movements in the MENA region I learned that although specific combination of some 
critical factors could be conducive to regime failure or success, but they are hardly able to 
provide an all-inclusive map regarding all the factors and causes that could lead reformation in 
the region. Moreover, just because a specific regime upholds its status quo during this wave of 
chaos and riots, we cannot conclude that it is entirely a strong or stable regime. The fact is it 
might not be vulnerable to the specific forms of mobilization that identified those revolts. 
In my opinion, besides the determiners that I mentioned, there are some other impactful 
factors that could affect the civil society, or the opposition groups should take into consideration. 
These three strategies, I believe, can get the protestors closer to their demand and bring a more 
prosperous outcome.  
First, to strengthen the movement’s solidity and weaken the unity of the adversary, the 
best possible tactic is the nonviolent one. However, at the same time they could use various 
tactics based on the level risks, but it should be peaceful. 
Second, the timing of the escalations should be chosen carefully. The protestors should 





an escalation with a proper timing could help a movement to experience a diverse group of 
people with the highest number of participants.  
Third, although a fruitful movement should be formed of people with the same demands 
and concerns but a diversified group of protesters with the same demand could be more 
successful in reaching their goals than a solid group of protesters.  
Elaboration on the above strategies is necessary for the future studies. In addition, scholars may 
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